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FOREWORD
In the wake of the Gulf War, there has been increased
interest in what the Soviets once called the Military
Technological Revolution (MTR) and what is now considered more
broadly as a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). In the strict
military sense, that revolution has to do with quantum changes in
areas ranging from information technologies to those dealing with
precision strike weaponry. These changes, in turn, will require
more adjustments in military doctrine and organization.
But as this study demonstrates, revolutions in military
affairs have never been strictly military phenomena. Social and
political transformations in the past have also been major and
often catalytic ingredients of such revolutions. The current
revolution is no exception, whether it involves the relationship
of communication-information breakthroughs to the interaction of
the elements of Clausewitz's remarkable trinity, or the civilmilitary aspects concerning the use of military force in the
post-cold war era.
In all this, the United States military, and particularly
the United States Army, is doctrinally ready to move into the
revolution underway in military affairs. On the one hand, there
is the emphasis on versatility in terms of dealing with the
changes that accompany any such revolution. On the other, there
is the continuity of the doctrinal framework, itself a product of
an earlier RMA, which will serve, this study convincingly
concludes, to ease many of the sociopolitical problems that may
emerge as the revolution in military affairs continues.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The line it is drawn
The curse it is cast
The slow one now will
Later be fast
As the present now
Will later be past
The order is rapidly fadin'
And the first one now
Will later be last
For the times they are a-changin'.
Bob Dylan
Bob Dylan's emphasis on change resonates for the American
military today as it seeks to come to grips with what the Soviet
Union once called the Military Technological Revolution (MTR) and
what is now considered a broader Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA). "We are in the midst of a dramatic change in the
relationship between technology and the nature of warfare,"
General William Odom has pointed out in this regard while
concluding that no one fully understands that relationship.
"Strategists must think about it, however, and try to uncover its
inchoate ramifications . . . if they are to design an effective
military doctrine and appropriate military capabilities for the
coming decades."1 That, of course, is easier said than done.
Throughout history, the interaction of technology and war has
been as much the result of the arbitrary and the accidental as
the inevitable and the necessary. "There are logical limits to
what can be predicted about technological change," the authors of
the National Defense University's Project 2025 concluded.
Revolutionary advancements are by their very nature
unforeseeable. That they will occur is a near
certainty; what they will be, however,is far less
certain. Changes in technology of a less-thanrevolutionary nature are difficult to predict as well.
Predicting what advancements will be made implies that
one knows that existing obstacles to developing a
technological capability can be overcome. This implies,
paradoxically, that one somehow knows the solution to
the relevant problems in advance of their actual
solution.2
What can help in all this is the knowledge that with change,
there is usually continuity due to what Robert Heilbroner calls
the "inertia of history." Inertia in this sense does not just
mean resistance to change, but also what Heilbroner refers to as
the "viscosity" of history--the tendency of people to repeat and
continue their way of doing things as long as possible. Thus,
despite the fact that the "normal" condition of man has been

sufficient to warrant revolution, such occurrences are remarkable
in history not for their frequency, but for their rarity.3 This
continuity plays a key role in biology and evolution as Stephan
Jay Gould has illustrated with the Panda's "thumb." Pandas are
the herbivorous descendants of carnivorous bears whose true
anatomical thumbs were used in those early days for meat eating.
With the adaption of their diet to bamboo, the pandas required
more flexibility in manipulation. Nevertheless, the pandas have
since made do with their makeshift substitute, the so-called
false thumb--a clumsy, suboptimal structure (a sesamoid thumb)
which, however, works.4
That such suboptimal continuity can apply to technology is
demonstrated by the survival of QWERTY as the first six letters
in the top row of the standard typewriter. That grouping came
about in the first place because in the crude technology of early
machines, excessive speed or unevenness of stroke could cause two
or more keys to jam, with any subsequent strokes increasing the
problem. As a result keys were moved around to find a proper
balance between speed and jamming. That balance was QWERTY, which
slowed down the maximal speed of typing by either allocating
common letters to weak fingers or dispersing those letters to
positions requiring a long stretch from the home row of keys.
This drastically suboptimal arrangement survived and has
continued to dominate up to the present, because the contingency
or historical quirk that led to the development was reinforced by
incumbency, much the same way some politicians can dominate for a
lifetime once they gain office and have access to privilege,
patronage and visibility. The continuity which accompanies the
quirkiness of history that produced the original condition is an
accepted part of the human condition; for absent that quirkiness,
man would not be on earth in an evolutionary sense to enjoy it.
"We need our odd little world," Gould concludes, "where QWERTY
rules and the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog."5
The search for continuity draws the statesman and the
analyst to the past, the start point in conventional wisdom for
the process of understanding change. Some, most notably Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, would not agree. What man learns from
history, the German philosopher pointed out, is that he does not
learn from history--that, in fact, wisdom and direction only
occur "when actuality is already there cut and dried after its
process of formation has been completed." "The owl of Minerva,"
Hegel concluded in this regard, "spreads its wings only with the
falling of the dusk."6 Others see the sine qua non for dealing
with the present and the future as knowledge of what has gone on
before, the absence of which, in George Santayana's famous maxim,
condemns man to repeat the past. This is sometimes perceived,
however, as encouragement to policymakers who tend to assume that
a trend in the past will continue into the future without
considering what produced that trend or why such a linear
projection might prove to be wrong. "Santayana's aphorism,"
Arthur Schlesinger has pointed out in this regard, "must be
reversed: too often it is those who can remember the past who are

condemned to repeat it."7
The answer to the problem of properly matching continuity
and change lies in the process of what Richard Neustadt and
Ernest May call thinking in "time streams." The core attribute
for such thinking is to imagine the future as it may be when it
becomes the past--a thing of complex continuity. Thus, the
primary challenge is to ascertain whether change has really
happened, is happening or will happen. "What's so new about
that?" is the operative question that can reveal continuity as
well as change. It is not, however, an easy matter to draw
reliable distinctions between the two in advance of retrospect.
How, for instance, could Herbert Hoover have known in the spring
of 1930 that the accustomed past would not reassert itself.
Certainly there was no guide in the experiences of the 1893-97
depression or the financial panics of 1907 and 1921.
Nevertheless, such sudden change does not occur that often in
history; and continuity remains an important anodyne from the
past that can inform the present and the future. This is why
somebody like Thucydides can seem so contemporary--why for
instance, the contest between Athens and Sparta in The
Peloponnesian War seemed to resonate again in the cold war, or
why the expedition to Syracuse had overtones for America's "halfwar" in Vietnam.8 Ultimately, this is why Hegel was wrong--why
the owl of Minerva actually flies at twilight, leaving the
student in the present as he looks to the past and the future, to
ascertain how much of the flight occurs at dawn and how much at
dusk.
Thinking in time can also help at the macro-level as the
United States prepares to enter a new millennium in which the
future is likely to remain as capricious as it often has been in
the past. As recent events have demonstrated, there are always
new "shocks" that can radically transform the loci of threats,
opportunities, or power. Strategic thinking in such an
environment has to deal with the relatively transparent threats
that still abound while attempting to cushion the nation against
the unexpected, whether in the form of environmental and human
disasters, incipient hostile ideology, or sudden technological
breakthroughs. But what is really new? Such an approach has been
the norm throughout most of America's history. The sense of
abnormality in the current transition period is actually an
artifact of the cold war. It was the bipolar stability of that
long twilight conflict that was the anomaly, the loss of which,
as Henry Kissinger noted of a similar period under the 19th
century European concert of powers, can come as a shock: "For in
the long interval of peace the sense of the tragic was lost; it
was forgotten that states could die, that upheavals could be
irretrievable . . . ."9
In contrast, for most of American history, U.S. strategists
have had to deal with a world in which the nature of prospective
opponents, and particularly the degree of threat, were relatively
more ambiguous than they were in the bipolar context of the

global environment after 1946. "In many respects . . . the era
ahead is ushering in a period of strategic normality," the
authors of the NDU futures project have concluded. "To the
historian writing in 2025, it will be the frozen simplicities of
the cold war that will seem bizarre, not the strategic flux that
characterized the periods before and after it."10
It is too early to know what those historians will say
concerning the current efforts by the U.S. armed forces to deal
with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This monograph
will attempt to demonstrate, however, that the American military,
particularly the U.S. Army, has been thinking in time streams for
a considerable period in dealing with its overall doctrinal
framework and that as a consequence, a mix of continuity and
change in that framework will carry it well and effectively into
the vortex of the RMA. That journey will not be without
significant problems, particularly in terms of using the fruits
of the RMA to apply force across the range of military
operations. But as this monograph will also demonstrate, those
problems, as in such revolutions in the past, have more to do
with politics and civil-military relations and cannot be fully
addressed by military doctrine alone.
In any event, broad knowledge based on thinking in time can
only reveal so much in terms of detailed change and continuity.
Dealing with doctrine in the "peaceful" change of the post-cold
war era will encounter similar difficulties. In such times, the
owl of Minerva still flies at an undetermined twilight; and the
military, as Michael Howard has pointed out,
is like a sailor navigating by dead reckoning. You have
left the terra firma of the last war and are
extrapolating from the experiences of that war. The
greater the distance from the last war, the greater
become the chances of error in this extrapolation.
Occasionally there is a break in the clouds: a smallscale conflict occurs somewhere and gives you a "fix"
by showing whether certain weapons and techniques are
effective or not: but it is always a doubtful mix . . .
. For the most part you have to sail on in a fog of
peace until at the last moment. Then, probably when it
is too late, the clouds lift and there is land
immediately ahead; breakers, probably, and rocks. Then
you find out rather late in the day whether your
calculations have been right or not.11

CHAPTER 2
THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
In the wake of the Gulf War, a host of officials and
analysts turned to what the Soviets had long considered was a
modern military revolution as an explanation for that victory.
"The war," Secretary of Defense Cheney concluded in the official
after-action report, "demonstrated dramatically the new
possibilities of what has been called the 'military-technological
revolution in warfare.'"12 This was matched by a study of the war
conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), which contained a chapter entitled "The Revolution in
Warfare" that was almost rhapsodic as it contemplated a future of
sophisticated battle management systems, space stations and
unmanned aerial vehicles.
In sum, the nature of warfare is changing. Although the
revolutioni in warfare is still underway, its outlines
have become clear. The effects of technology--in
precision guided weapons, in stealthy delivery systems,
in advanced sensor and targeting systems, in battle
management platforms--is transforming and in fact
already has demonstrably transformed the way in which
armed forces conduct their operations.13
In 1993, the CSIS devoted an entire report to the RMA, "a
fundamental advance in technology, doctrine or organization
that
renders existing methods of conducting warfare obsolete."14 A true
revolution, the study included, would require a holistic effect
provided by the integrating framework of doctrine and
organization coupled with the enabling capabilities (e.g.,
information dominance, C2) and the executing capabilities (e.g.,
smart weapons, major platforms) provided by technology. "One
without the other more often constitutes an evolution."15
The most enthusiastic response to the revolutionary aspects
of the Gulf conflict has come from Alvin and Heidi Toffler who
see it as ushering in what they term Third Wave warfare. The
First, or agrarian wave, was launched by the agriculture
revolution 10,000 years ago; the Second, or industrial wave, in
the last 300 years by a combination of the Newtonian and
Industrial Revolutions. The Third, or post-industrial wave,
coexists with the other two waves, creating a trisected world, in
which the First Wave sector supplies agricultural and mineral
resources and the Second Wave cheap labor for mass production,
while the Third Wave rises rapidly to dominance based on the
creation and exploitation of knowledge.16
In this milieu, the Tofflers see the addition of a Third
Wave war form as increasing the potential for heterogeneity in
the wars the United States must prevent or fight. In other words,
older warfare forms don't entirely disappear when newer ones
arise, just as Second Wave mass production has not disappeared

with the advent of customized Third Wave products. As a
consequence, there are today approximately 20 countries with
regionally significant Second Wave armies. And some of these as
well as a few First Wave countries are attempting to gain Third
Wave technology. The result is a wide range of military
operations. At one end are the small, essentially First Wave
civil wars and violent conflicts in poor or low tech countries
accompanied by sporadic terrorism and drug wars. At the other end
is the Third Wave warfare presaged, in part, by the Gulf War.
Somewhere in between and lapping at the successive wave, as it
did in Kuwait, is the very strong residue of the large scale
Second Wave warfare.17
The task for the future in all this is to develop "niche
warriors" for Third Wave niche warfare that will eventually
replace large scale, second wave conflicts. These warriors, the
Tofflers envisage "will wage information-intensive warfare,
making use of the latest Third Wave technologies now on the
horizon."18 That in turn will require a new type of fighter,
variously referred to as the "Ph.D. with Rucksack," the
"Knowledge Warriors," and the "Software Soldiers." "Mindless
warriors are to Third Wave war," they conclude, "what unskilled
manual laborers are to the Third Wave economy--an endangered
species."19
The basic outline of the doctrinal framework for the RMA was
also visible to the Tofflers in the Gulf War, reinforcing their
belief that AirLand Battle (ALB) as it evolved in the late 1970s
and 1980s represented "the U.S. military's first conscious
attempt to adapt to the Third Wave of change."20 It is for them by
no means a completed action. Just as the civilization brought by
the Third Wave has not yet reached its mature form, so is ALB
only a beginning as the form of Third Wave war moves toward full
development. In fact, widespread cutbacks in military funding
will cause the armed forces to seek to do more with less and thus
accelerate what the Tofflers perceive as a profound
reconceptualization of war.
What is becoming apparent now is that the military
revolution that began with Air-Land Battle and made its
first public appearance during the Gulf War is still
only in its infancy. The years ahead, despite budget
cuts and rhetoric about peace in the world, will see
military doctrines around the world change in response
to new challenges and new technologies.21
Other reactions to the Gulf War and discussions of the RMA
have been more cautious. While acknowledging the effectiveness of
such technology as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System (JSTAR) and the expanded volume of firepower delivery in
such systems for tactical missiles as the Army Tactical Missile
System (ATACMS) and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS),
some observers also point to problems ranging from those dealing
with intelligence and bomb damage assessments to those concerning

the tracking of the relatively primitive SCUD launchers. Others
focus on what the Tofflers call a dual war form and emphasize
that much of the technology used in the Gulf War dated back at
least two decades. Thus, there was the mix of M113 APCs with M2
Bradleys; M60A3 tanks with M1A1 Abrams; and B-52Gs and F-4G "Wild
Weasels" helping the F-117A stealth fighters. "The 'militarytechnical revolution' sparkled in the new systems," Eliot Cohen
has pointed out in this regard, "but it drew as much on
considerably more mature technologies."22 In any event, like the
Tofflers, most observers agree that to see the Gulf War as
evidence of a full blown RMA is premature. The experience in that
conflict, one concluded, "only hints at what might be possible in
the revolutionary transformation of U.S. military capabilities
were a military-technical revolution to be created."23
Finally, another group of observers sees the preoccupation
with an RMA and Third Wave warfare as missing the basic point:
the structure of international relations is rapidly changing and
with it a return to First not Third Wave conflict. For A. J.
Bacevich, this preoccupation on the part of the military
demonstrates nothing more than "wooly-headed sentimentality" for
the past embodied in massive Second Wave warfare.24 As a result,
the message from current military thinking in terms of the RMA is
"that the future will be a reprise of World War II in the fancy
dress of high technology."25 It is, in short, a linear extension
of the past into the future, one in which the military's view of
technological marvels "offers a vision of war with which Patton
himself would have felt right at home."26
In a similar manner, so-called "Fourth Generation Warfare"
theorists moved early on beyond their Reform Movement
preoccupation with maneuver warfare to argue that the statecentric world of Clausewitz's remarkable trinity (government,
military, people) was ending. The first three generations of
warfare came about since 1648 because of the interaction of
technological advances and battlefield application combined
secondarily with political imperatives. Now, however, nationstates are losing their importance as the primary actors in the
international arena, even as nongovernmental organizations
increasingly wage conflict to further their own policies. As a
consequence, the Fourth Generation world is a return to a pre1648 environment of politics and war. In this non-trinitarian
world, technology may become virtually irrelevant, with military
forces, effective in second and third generation conflict,
rendered useless in a Tofflerian First Wave environment marked by
flashpoints ranging from groups like the Medellin cartel to
failed states such as Somalia.27
Martin van Creveld returned to the non-trinitarian theme
after the Gulf War in his study on The Transformation of War, in
which there is "every prospect that religious attitudes, beliefs
and fanaticisms will play a larger role in the motivation of
armed conflict than it has, in the West at any rate, for the last
300 years."28 In this large cyclic continuity, he sees the state

losing its monopoly over armed violence and a shift to lowintensity conflicts in which advanced military technology will
become increasingly irrelevant. "Considering the present and
trying to look into the future," he concludes, "I suggest the
Clausewitzian Universe is rapidly becoming out of date and can no
longer provide us with a proper framework for understanding
war."29 To which John Keegan agrees, pointing out that technology
in the form of nuclear weapons long ago undermined Clausewitz's
most basic dictum. Non-trinitarian tendencies in current
international relations only further discredited this
proposition. "War is not the continuation of policy by other
means," he concludes.
. . . Clausewitz's thought is incomplete. It implies
the existence of states, of state interests and of
rational calculation about how they may be achieved . .
. . What it made no allowances for at all was war
without beginning or end, the endemic warfare of nonstate, even pre-state peoples.30
Finally, all this has been tied by Robert Kaplan into an
apocalyptic view of the future world in which the need for a
military technical revolution becomes a gross irrelevance as
states lose their legal monopoly of armed force and the current
distinctions between war and crime break down. At that time, he
points out, "the classificatory grid of nation-states is going to
be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city states, shantystates, nebulous and anarchic regionalisms . . . ."31 It will be a
"bifurcated world" with part of the globe inhabited by Hegel's
and Fukuyama's last man--the well-fed recipient of all that
technology can offer, and the other, much larger part, peopled by
Hobbes's First Man, living out his "poor, nasty, brutish, and
short" life. Like van Creveld, Kaplan sees re-primitivized man in
warrior societies operating in an environment marked by planetary
overcrowding and unprecedented resource scarcity in which state
supported, technologically-enhanced military will have no effect.
The intense savagery of the fighting in such diverse
cultural settings as Liberia, Bosnia, the Caucasus, and
Sri Lanka--to say nothing of what obtains in American
inner cities--indicates something very troubling that
those of us inside the stretch limo, concerned with
issues like middle-class entitlements and the future of
interactive cable television, lack the stomach to
contemplate. It is this: a large number of people on
this planet, to whom the comfort and stability of a
middle-class life is utterly unknown, find war and a
barracks existence a step up rather than a step down.32
Thinking in Time: Doctrine and Technology.
The interrelationship of technology and doctrine is an
essential, but extremely complex part of a military revolution.

"A true RMA," Daniel Goure has pointed out in this regard,
"involves not just technological advance but also changes to the
way that militaries think about, organize themselves for, and
wage combat."33 The problem is to keep these elements in balance
during times of great change. The current period, for example,
may be one in which military potential could leap from one
technical era to the next, as occurred between the Napoleonic
Wars and the Franco Prussian War and between the two World Wars
of this century. The rapid changes in computers and communication
combined with the equally swift cost decline of both have already
caused revolutionary changes in large corporate businesses that
have not been seen since the advent of mass bureaucracies in the
previous centuries. Similar changes could produce fundamental
alterations in the military sphere ranging from the most basic
notions of hierarchy and span of control to centralization and
response time.34
In such an environment, the chicken-egg question concerning
doctrine and technology will not become any easier than it has
been in the past. The CSIS report on the military revolution, for
instance, concludes that "decisions on doctrine . . . become a
precondition and guidance for integrating the research and
development of new technologies."35 One example is how development
of mechanized warfare doctrine led to the creation of selfpropelled, protected artillery, capable of keeping up with the
movements of armor units. And in World War II, the need for an
amphibious vehicle that could move cargo from ship to shore
resulted in the creation of the DUKW, or "Duck," used extensively
in the amphibious operations in both the European and Pacific
theaters.36 On the other hand, this order runs the risk of
distorting the result of technological breakthroughs. If doctrine
dominates technology, the technological advantages may be
overlooked, causing a quiet evolution rather than the much
greater change that may be possible or necessary. And in fact
some of the worst failures in warfare have come about not so much
from an unwillingness to adopt new technologies, as from a
persistence in clinging to older doctrines and then adusting the
new technologies to those doctrines. In the U.S. Civil War, for
instance, outdated tactics from the age of Napoleon were used in
the face of modern riflery, new artillery and rifle
entrenchments. In a similar manner, most European armies on the
eve of World War I possessed doctrines emphasizing offensive
maneuver and rapid, decisive battles that barely acknowledged the
new technologies represented by a host of modern weapons ranging
from artillery to the machine gun.37
That war at the outset also saw the continued retention of
horse cavalry, a trend that demonstrated more than the military's
inability to move beyond outmoded doctrines and comfortable but
obsolete techniques. For as Michael Howard has pointed out, the
case for cavalry not just as a reconnaissance force but in a
battlefield role, was cogently made prior to 1914 by officers who
had already experienced the Franco-Prussian, the Russo-Turkish
and the Russo-Japanese Wars. In a similar manner, most Europeans

in this period ignored the lessons of changing warfare made clear
over and over again in the American Civil War. That conflict,
most concluded, came about because of unique terrain
characteristics combined with poor training and leadership, not
because of new technology.38 With or without the major test of
war, innovation, as the complex relationship of doctrine and
technology evolves, may not occur; and there is always the
potential of facing a situation that JFC Fuller described after
the Great War. "We had made up our minds to play whist," he wrote
of 1914, "and when we sat down we found that the game was
poker."39
In the end, there is nothing new in the need to balance the
opposing logic of technology and doctin military affairsrine. For
technology, that logic is linear with a focus that will always be
on efficiency through such methods as standardization and
repetition. Doctrine, on the other hand, has to do with how a
military fights an opponent and is thus concerned with
effectiveness on what is after all at least a two-way strategic
street. As a result, its underlying logic is paradoxical. The
same action in war, for example, will not always cause the same
result--and in fact probably just the opposite. "Given an
opponent who is capable of learning," van Creveld has pointed out
in this regard, "a very real danger exists that an action will
not succeed twice because it has succeeded once."40
Making technology serve with doctrine, then, is a complex
business. Efficiency may not be conducive to effectiveness and
may in fact be just the opposite. A straight line in war, for
example, is not always best. And although the line least expected
may be the longest between two points, it may become the shortest
and thus the most effective because the enemy considers it to be
the longest. On the other hand, the price for the use of
technology in war is a diminishment of its efficiency. Thus,
estimates of technological superiority can be misleading without
consideration of doctrine for the use of that technology. It was
not, after all, just the intrinsic technical superiority of the
longbows that brought victory to the English at Crecy, but the
interaction of that weapon with the tactics and equipment of the
French.41
In all this, there is much to extract from the time streams.
To begin with, there is the sheer ubiquity of modern technology
typified by the image of computer-dependent weapons and equipment
together with their operators at every level of war. That such
technology is a continuing and vital part of service doctrines is
a given in the modern era. But such specialization can also carry
the seeds of future problems that doctrine can't remedy, as the
classic 16th century sea battle of Lepanto demonstrated. It was
the loss of the Ottoman archers using the traditional Turkish
weapon, the composite bow, that was the key aspect of the 30,000
Turkish dead out of 60,000 men engaged at that battle. For the
composite bow required a lifetime of work and practice to master
the requisite skills. It was the loss of these skilled naval

archers, irreplaceable in a single generation, that made Lepanto
the turning point in Mediterranean affairs since that battle
"marked the death of a living tradition that could not be
reconstituted."42
Other lessons abound in history. The pitfalls of doctrine
following a technology-dependent strategic concept can be studied
in the creation of the U.S. Pentomic Army in the late 1950s. And
there is the recognition that in developing doctrine, some
weapons will not be effective until other technological advances
occur. The machine gun, for instance, had to await the invention
of smokeless powder--also a reminder that old and new
technologies can be integrated and have a great effect on
doctrine. The classic case is the relatively minor replacement in
the 16th century of the plug bayonet with the ring bayonet which
allowed the infantry to continue firing with the bayonet
attached, thus transforming the role of the infantry and ending
the debate over "pike" to "shot" ratios.43 A more recent case is
the use of stealth aircraft to precede conventional air in
operations during the Gulf War.
The Gulf War is also a reminder that it is important to
focus on the correct doctrinal and technological aspects in the
after-action phase of any conflict. Less than a century has
passed, in this regard, since the Russo-Japanese War, in which
the French chose to buttress their doctrinal arguments from the
lessons of the successful Japanese offensives rather than examine
the implications of the defensive effectiveness of the machine
gun and barb wire. That war also offers an example in the
subsequent fate of the Czarist army of what can befall a military
that does not innovate with doctrine and technology after defeat.
"Defeat by itself does not tell a military organization what
future wars will look like," Stephen Rosen has observed, "only
that its preparations for the war just ended were not adequate."44
History also demonstrates that doctrinal and technological
surprise is ephemeral at best. The doctrine of Blitzkrieg was
soon matched by new doctrines and radical reorganizations
combined with mass manufacture of anti-armor weaponry. And such
countermeasures over the years have generally ended attempts to
find technological panaceas in the form of wonder weapons. Thus,
there were the dashed expectations for the SAM as an end to the
airplane, for the shaped-charge guided missile in terms of
destroying the tank, and for the attack submarine as a means to
eliminate the surface vessel.45 Only the nuclear weapon has defied
attempts to mitigate its technological ability to surprise, with
restraint only possible in a mutual doctrine of non-use based on
"rationally" assured destruction. That this restraint could break
down in an age of nuclear proliferation is reinforced by time
streams going as far back as 1137, when the Lateran Council
banned the use of the crossbow against Christian enemies, citing
that weapon as not only destructive to mankind, but as being
hateful to God. Richard Coeur de Lion reintroduced the crossbow
into European wars, and many saw his death in 1199 by a bolt from

that weapon as a clear expression of divine displeasure at the
affront to chivalric custom which disapproved of all weapons
other than sword and lance. Nevertheless, technological
innovation continued to outstrip the Council's prohibitions in
the years to come. By 1529, Pierre du Tuerrail de Bayard,
chevalier sans peur et sans reproche, could thank God that he had
always used the proper weapons against knights: the sword, the
lance and the crossbow.46
The role of the Lateran Council is also a reminder that
there is nothing new in the interaction of policy at the highest
civilian and military level with the development of doctrine and
technology. In the interwar years, for example de Gaulle's
proposal for a professional 100,000 man mechanized force was
rejected because, among other reasons, of the political
objections to the creation of a force designed primarily for
offensive conflict.47 In Germany, on the other hand, it was Hitler
who pressed Blitzkrieg on an army that preferred to superimpose
new technology on its current offensive doctrine rather than to
experiment and innovate doctrinally to exploit to a greater
degree all its potential. "That's what I need," he is reported to
have stated in February 1935 after his first glimpse of tank
maneuvers. "That's what I want to have."48 And finally, on a more
modern note, there was the resistance by the U.S. Army in the
1960s, despite the personal direction of the President, to
develop army-wide capabilities for counterinsurgency doctrine
because of the institutional belief that conventional wars would
continue to dominate the Army's strategic requirement.49
Thinking in Time: The Sociopolitical Aspects of RMAs.
"A military revolution, in the fullest sense," the Tofflers
have observed, "occurs only . . . when an entire society
transforms itself, forcing its armed services to change at every
level simultaneously--from technology and culture to
organization, strategy, tactics, training, doctrine and
logistics. When that happens, the relationship of the economy and
society is transformed . . . ."50 But technology is still key. And
the modern pace of change, as van Creveld has demonstrated, is
far removed from what he calls the "Age of Tools," the two
millennia from approximately 500 BC to 1500 AD in which, after a
few basic inventions like bronze weapons and wheeled vehicles,
technological change had little effect on the conduct of war.
There were, of course, such innovations as the stirrup and the
high saddle; but the period was marked more by the constant
alteration of existing technologies than the invention of new
ones. This leisurely pace of technological change provided a
stability to war for the age of tools with the result that
important similarities persisted from conflict in ancient Greece
to war in the later Middle Ages. For the Europeans of 1500, the
past remained "contemporary history, freely to be culled for
inspiration, examples, and for even outright models to copy."51

Even new technology in the form of gunpowder was not enough
to cause a revolution as the old age began to end. The
combination of archers and men-at-arms reached its climax at
Agincourt. The next generations abandoned the bow and turned more
and more to firearms, vainly groping for a tactical form of that
firepower to substitute for the bow. The paradox of this
doctrinal dilemma was that the introduction of the handgun caused
a steep decline in firepower. So superior was the longbow in
speed, accuracy and mobility, that even toward the end of the
17th century, military writers pleaded for it to be
reintroduced.52
Nevertheless, as Michael Roberts has demonstrated, major
changes occurred between 1560 and 1660 in four areas: tactics,
strategy, size of armies, and sociopolitical institutions. All
together, these changes amounted to a "military revolution."53
Robert's thesis is linear. At the tactical level, Maurice of
Nassau's doctrinal innovations changed the traditional 50-foot
deep pike square into a line of musketry only 10 feet deep, all
of which minimized the effect of incoming fire while maximizing
the outgoing fire effect. This exposed more men to face-to-face
combat which in turn required superior courage, proficiency and
discipline for each soldier. It also required entire tactical
units to perform swiftly and in unison the motions required for
volley-firing. The answer was regimentation and discipline with
troops trained to fire, countermarch, load and maneuver
together.54
To all this, Gustavus Adolphus added more doctrinal
innovations in the Thirty Years War--all resulting in a
combination, in Robert's words, of "firepower and shock as nobody
had been able to do since firearms replaced bows," thus ensuring
"the recovery of the art of war from the debility which had been
the result of the inventions of firearms."55 These tactical
innovations led to a revolution in strategy as commanders in the
Thirty Years War broadened their horizons and began to look at
Central Europe as one great theater of war with conflict ranging
over Germany in its entirety as well as along its borders from
Poland and Italy to Lorraine and the Netherlands. The new
perspective was demonstrated in Gustavus' plan for the
destruction of the Austrian Habsburgs by the simultaneous
operations of five to seven armies, all effectively coordinated
to move under his direction on a great curving front from the
middle Oder to the Alpine passes. "(A)ll the wars of Europe," he
wrote, "are now blended into one."56
The enlarged scope of warfare caused great increases in the
size of armies which in turn led to even more ambitious and
complex strategies for making use of the new forces. All of this
meant that waging war became more of a burden and a problem both
for the civilian populations and their rulers because of greater
costs, greater damages and casualties, and greater administrative
challenges. In addition to more people participating directly in
war, the growth of armies brought in a host of noncombatants such

as entrepenuers and financiers who controlled the economic
wherewithall of conflict and with whom the governments had to
deal, paying inordinate sums for uniforms, weaponry and
equipment. In response, the state changed the structure and
philosophy of government, creating the social-political
institutions that placed the ways and means of war in
governmental hands. "By 1660," Michael Roberts concluded of the
revolution that had begun with a fortuitous mix of new doctrine,
organization and technology, "the modern art of war had come to
birth."
Mass armies, strict discipline, absolute submergence of
the individual, had already arrived; the conjoint
ascendancy of financial power and applied science was
already established in all its malignity; the use of
propaganda, psychological warfare, and terrorism as
military weapons was already familiar to theorists, as
well as to commanders in the field; and the last
remaining qualms as to the religious and ethical
legitimacy of war seemed to have been stilled. The road
lay open, broad and straight, to the abyss of the
twentieth century.57
Despite the openness of that road, the transformation
occasioned by the military revolution was slower and the impact
less total than was once thought. Throughout the 17th and early
18th century in Scotland, for instance, there were numerous
encounters in which regular troops equipped with all the tools
provided by the military revolution were defeated by the headlong
charge of undisciplined clansmen armed with traditional weapons.
Only at Culloden in 1746 did the Hanoverian army stop the
Highland Charge and even then only because the British had
overwhelming numerical superiority, considerable field artillery
and, most importantly, improved fire control. In fact, the
military revolution created problems to which there was no easy
solution, the most prominent being that strategic thinking was
crushed between the sustained growth in the size of armies and
the relative scarcity of money, equipment and food. The result,
as Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill and Orrery, wrote in the 1670s, was
that "(b)attells do not now decide national quarrels . . . .For
we make war more like foxes, than like lyons . . . ."58
As a consequence, the classic conflicts in the age of the
military revolution were all "long wars," whether the French
religious wars of 1562-98 and again in 1621-29 or the "80 Years
War" in the Netherlands which involved continuous hostilities
there between 1572 and 1607 and between 1621 and 1647. Equally
important, this tendency continued to mark the battles of the
next century. Thus the War of the Spanish Succession continued
from 1701 to 1713 in spite of Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde and
Malplaquet. The "drama intrinsic to great battles," Russell
Weigly has observed of the period, "often diverted attention from
indecisiveness; but recalcitrant, intractable indecision
nevertheless persisted."59

Decisiveness returned to the battlefield in the age of
Napoleon without the benefit of any new technology. Classical
strategy, as Figure 1 illustrates, had focused since the time of
Alexander on the destruction of the enemy by means of
concentration in terms of intra-battle maneuver and the battle
itself. The metaphor, James Schneider points out, was one of
torque with force applied at one end of a lever being
concentrated at a single point on the other end.60 It was a
metaphor that could still apply to Napoleon. For while the French
leader revolutionized the concepts of space and time with the
concentric maneuvers of his major, independent, combined arms
units, those maneuvers were still intra-battle in nature, focused
for the most part on the destruction of the enemy in concentrated
battle.

The real revolution was captured by Clausewitz as he
evaluated what had taken place at each level of the Napoleonic
Wars. For the Prussian philosopher, the essence of the change was
a conceptual framework in which separated military events were
molded together to achieve higher objectives. It was, in fact, a
vertical continuum (Figure 2) in which war emerged as a
continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other

means.

At the tactical level, Clausewitz wrote, "the means are
fighting forces trained for combat; the end is victory." For the
strategist, however, he concluded that military victories were
meaningless unless they were the means to obtain a political end,
"those objects which lead directly to peace."61 Thus, strategy was
"the linking together (Verbindung) of separate battle engagements
into a single whole, for the final object of the war."62 And only
the political or policy level could determine that objective. "To
bring a war, or any one of its campaigns to a successful close
requires a thorough grasp of national policy," Clausewitz pointed
out. "On that level strategy and policy coalesce . . . .63
The full impact of both Clausewitz's concept and Napoleon's
approach to war had to await the technology which by the time of
the American Civil War ushered in a revolution in military
affairs that continued through World War I (Figure 1). To begin
with, there was the breechloading rifle, the increased lethality
of which rendered the dense Napoleonic tactical formations and
tactics obsolete, as American Civil War soldiers discovered more
quickly than their leaders. But that lethality also renewed

interest in Napoleon's concept of extended time and space,
because as battle space began to expand in proportion to the new
range of the improved weapons, the looser formations occasioned
by those weapons had the effect of emptying the battlefield. At
the same time, the railroads speeded the movement of troops to
the battle areas, simplified logistical problems, and, by the
nature of their organizational railheads, enforced the emerging
distributed pattern of operations. The addition of the telegraph
combined with the railroad helped to unify large geographically
separate military formations, while also drawing in what Michael
Roberts described as the sociopolitical elements that accompany
military revolutions. In the Civil War, for example, the
telegraph and the railroad contributed by mail and communications
as well as the flow of wounded and furloughed soldiers to the
psychological front-to-rear link that had begun with the
completion of the Clausewitzian trinity by the French nation-inarms during the French revolutionary wars.64
That linkage also insured a continuous mobilization of the
home front which in turn meant a continuous stream of logistics
contributing to operationally durable formations (Figure 1). The
result, as the constant litany of Confederate tactical victories
illustrated through much of the war, was that single battles no
longer determined national destinies. But as Grant illustrated in
his use of armies scattered throughout the eastern United States
in 1864-65, improved communications coupled with large
operationally durable formations, could result in inter-battle
maneuvers and thus in decisive operations and campaigns
distributed in extended time and space. The result was something
that went beyond the adjustment of activities to one another,
which is the essence of coordination. It was in fact a process to
which the metaphor of fluid rather than torque could apply, since
pressure in one area might result in simultaneous or successive
results elsewhere. Over a century later it would be described as
synchronization, a concept that could involve activities far
removed from each other in time or space, or both, "if their
combined consequences are felt at the decisive time and place."65
That process was captured in a letter to Grant in 1864. "I think
our campaign of the last month," Sherman wrote from Savannah, "as
well as every step I take from this point northward, is as much a
direct attack upon Lee's army as though we were operating within
the sound of his artillery."66 The larger lesson of the century,
however, was captured by Paul Kennedy, an historian accustomed to
thinking in time streams.
All these wars--whether fought in the Tennessee Valley
or the Bohemian plain, in the Crimean Peninsula or the
field of Lorraine--pointed to one general conclusion:
the powers which were defeated were those that had
failed to adapt to the 'military revolution' of the
mid-nineteenth century, the acquisition of new weapons,
the mobilizing and equipping of large armies, the use
of improved communications offered by the railway, the
steamship and the telegraph, and a productive

industrial base to sustain the armed forces.67
But that adaption did not include full doctrinal conversion
from classical strategy, which World War I would reveal as
inadequate to deal with the intricacies of modern warfare.
Napoleon had defined that strategy as the "art of making use of
time and space." But as demonstrated in the Civil War, the
dimensions of these two variables had been stretched and rendered
more complex by the interaction of technology with the elements
of the Clausewitzian trinity. And that very complexity, augmented
by the lack of decisiveness at the tactical level, impeded the
vertical continuum of war outlined in Clausewitz' definition of
strategy as the use of engagements to achieve policy objectives,68
and personified in 1917 by the French general who lamented: "Guns
yes, prisoners yes, but all at an outrageous cost and without
strategic results."69
Only when the continuum was enlarged, as the Great War
demonstrated, was it possible to restore warfighting coherence to
modern combat. And that, in turn, required the classical concept
of strategy to be positioned at a midpoint, an operational level,
designed to orchestrate individual tactical engagements and
battles in order to achieve strategic results (Figure 3). Now, a
military strategic level was added as another way station on the
vertical road to the fulfillment of policy objectives. This left
the concept of strategy, as it had been understood since the time
of Clausewitz, transformed into:
the level of war at which campaigns and major
operations are planned, conducted and sustained to
accomplish strategic objectives . . . . Activities at
this level link tactics and strategy . . . . These
activities imply a broader dimension of time or space
than do tactics; they provide the means by which
tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic
objectives.70

CHAPTER 3
U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE RMA
In the wake of Vietnam, the U.S. Army returned to its
traditional focus on Europe. During the previous decade, the
Warsaw Pact had added impressive qualitative improvements to its
already crushing numerical preponderance--a trend only magnified
by new analytical and gaming techniques which emphasized the
quantifiable components of combat power. Added to this was the
1973 Yom Kippur War, the violence and lethality of which came as
a shock to an officer corps conditioned by years of low-intensity
warfare in Southeast Asia. At the same time, an already
demoralized army found itself without a peacetime draft and on
the receiving end of a decade-long deficit in equipment
modernization as well as a large manpower reduction. The result
was "Active Defense," promulgated in the 1976 edition of FM 1005, Operations--a doctrine that made a tactical virtue of what was
perceived as a strategic necessity by translating NATO's
politically driven requirement of forward defense into
operational method.71
The criticism of Active Defense began even before the final
result was published. The doctrine was attacked for a lack of
offensive spirit and the loss of all the tactical imponderables
like initiative and morale that accompanied such a spirit; for
what was perceived as an overemphasis on firepower to the
detriment of maneuver; and for the submergence of tactical
creativity in a wave of attrition calculations. But the most
telling criticism was that there was no operational content in
the new doctrine, which promised at best, its critics charged, to
defer defeat without any possibility of operational success. "In
seeking to fulfill its doctrinal commitment to winning the first
battle,'" Richard Sinnreich has pointed out, "the Army was
accused of becoming so preoccupied with fighting the first battle
that it forgot all about winning the last. For an Army
traumatized by ten years of tactical success culminating in
operational failure, no critique could have been more
devastating."72
At the same time, there was renewed focus on Soviet
doctrine, particularly the use of follow-on forces which were
tailored-made, critics pointed out, against an Active Defense
that depended on lateral reinforcement from less threatened areas
in lieu of retaining major reserves. This impetus to extend the
battlefield, however, required technology that could only be
provided by the Air Force--an operative imperative that meant
that a battle extended in time and space would have to be an
AirLand Battle (ALB). The result was the promulgation of ALB
doctrine in the 1982 FM 100-5, which brought the Army full circle
back to the three levels of war as a doctrinal framework for
"securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it
aggressively to defeat the enemy."73 As a consequence, there was
nothing new in the motivation for creating combat coherence

throughout the vertical continuum of war in that framework. It
was simply the age-old combination of technology and doctrine as
a means to return to basics--a return to the business of winning
by an Army that was unwilling, in Sinnreich's words, "to stomach
indefinitely a . . . doctrine which appeared to enshrine the draw
as the objective of military operations."74
The 1986 FM 100-5 continued the focus of 1982, adding
operational art as the method for working the operational level
of war while continuing to emphasize the absolute dominance of
the strategic level in the vertical continuum. It is an emphasis
that has been renewed in the current manual:
Since wars are fought for strategic purposes, the
doctrine addresses the strategic context of the
application of force. Since battle is translated into
strategic objectives by operational art, a major
portion of the manual addresses the operational level
of war. And since all operations must be based on sound
tactics, a major portion of the text covers tactics.75
By now, the other armed forces have followed the Army lead
in terms of using the vertical levels of war as a basic doctrinal
framework--so much so that the current JCS basic doctrinal
publication bears more than a little resemblance to the 1986 Army
manual.
The operational level links the tactical employment of
forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level
is on operational art--the use of military forces to
achieve strategic goals through the design,
organization, and execution of campaigns and major
operations. Operational art helps commanders use
resources efficiently and effectively to achieve
strategic objectives. It provides a framework to assist
commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing
campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps
commanders understand the conditions for victory before
seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles.
Without operational art, war would be a set of
disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the
only measure of successor failure.76
Within this overarching framework, the 1993 FM 100-5 clearly
perceives doctrine as the engine that drives the development of
technology. "Doctrine seeks to be sufficiently broad and forward
looking so that it rapidly accommodates major technological
opportunities . . . . It sets the conditions to exploit
technologies . . . ."77 Implicit in this perception is the fact
that even as the current national strategy calls for a policy of
global engagement, the CONUS-based force projection that is
replacing forward defense coupled with a simultaneous build-down
in resources necessitate an optimizing of developing
technologies. This relationship of technology to doctrine is

pervasive throughout the manual. Power projection, for instance,
always runs the risk of the deploying force attacking too soon
before the full component has arrived or waiting so long for that
full deployment that initiative returns to the opponent. This
risk can be mitigated, the FM points out, by using technology to
perform such support functions as intelligence analysis and some
logistics management from CONUS. The result is that more
deployment space can be allocated to combat units--the type of
leverage that one of the original authors of ALB has pointed out
"is too great to ignore."78
The new doctrine has other strong ties to the past,
retaining, for example, the orientation on offensive actions and
the familiar tenets of agility, initiative, depth and
synchronization. To this, in response to the changing
international environment, has been added "versatility," which
"denotes the ability to perform in many roles and environments
during war and operations other than war."79 Operations other than
war (OOTW) can involve combat missions ranging from strikes and
raids to peace enforcement as well as noncombat missions that
could include disaster relief and civil support both at home and
abroad. Force projections in such an environment might include
entirely different successive missions for a unit, involving
noncombat operations in wartime or actual combat in OOTW. The
flexibility involved goes far beyond agility which emphasizes
faster physical and mental reaction from the enemy. That tenet,
the manual concludes, applies to a boxer; versatility to the
decathlete. The U.S. Army, like the decathlete, is capable of
rapid realignment and refocus on widely divergent missions
because of discipline and training.80
In all this, the vertical continuum of war remains as the
doctrinal construct. To begin with the manual draws upon the 1986
contention that the levels in that continuum are not concerned so
much with the level of command or the size of the unit as with
the planned outcome. "The intended purpose," the current manual
points out," . . . determines whether an Army unit functions at
the operational level."81 From this position, the expansiveness of
missions under "full dimensional operations" poses no doctrinal
problems for the underlying framework. "The levels of war apply
not only to war but also to operations other than war."82
This does not mean, however, that war's pride of place has
been relinquished to OOTW. The introduction to the new manual
emphasizes that the "primary focus is warfighting and how
commanders put all the elements together to achieve victory at
least cost to American soldiers."83 The allusion to victory is
also a standard linkage to past doctrines that is now applicable
to full dimensional operations by an Army capable of "quick,
decisive victory--on and off the battlefield--anywhere in the
world and under virtually any conditions . . . ."84 The expansion
of this linkage was confirmed by one of the authors of the
current doctrine, even as he emphasized the continuity. "The
essential criterion . . . remains the same," James McDonough

concludes, "victory--or for operations other than war, success."85
But there is no escaping the dominance of the warfighting
imperative in the current FM 100-5.

The Army must be capable of achieving decisive victory.
The Army must maintain the capability to put
overwhelming combat power on the battlefield to defeat
all enemies through a total force effort. It produces
forces of the highest quality, able to deploy rapidly,
to fight, to sustain themselves, and to win quickly
with minimum casualties. That is decisive victory.86
The Altered Framework.
The framework provided by the vertical continuum of war is
changing. The Gulf War demonstrated the coalition's ability to
use new technology to strike simultaneously at all three levels
of war with what were normally considered strategic capabilities.
For Iraq, these attacks across the entire nation paralyzed its
military effort, with Iraqi forces compelled to operate
throughout the country as if they were within visual range of the
coalition military without any of the normal distinctions between
rear, deep and close operations. "All of this means," one
analysis concludes, "that in future conflict the three levels of
war, as separate and distinct loci of command and functional
responsibilities, will be spaced and timed out of existence."87
The CSIS report on the military technological revolution agrees
that the RMA "clearly holds the potential to blur or permanently
erase, the distinction between tactical, theater and strategic
war."88 But the JCS Doctrine for Joint Operations is more
cautious, preferring a balance of change and continuity.
Advances in technology, information-age media
reporting, and the compression of time-space
relationships contribute to the growing
interrelationships between the levels of war. The
levels of war help commanders visualize a logical flow
of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to
the appropriate command. However, commanders at every
level must be aware that in a world of constant,
immediate communications, any single event may cut
across the three levels.89
Figure 4 is the familiar depiction of the vertical continuum
of war, with the darkened center area representing the
operational art required to orchestrate the tactical events in
area 1 to form the military conditions at the operational level
that will achieve strategic objectives in area 2. Figure 5
depicts the more balanced approach to the future reflected in the
JCS description. The expansion and overlap represents a trend
that began earlier this century with the advent of mechanization,
the radio and air forces. The checkered area demonstrates the
future blurring of all three levels of war--the zone of

integration and simultaneity. Finally, the darkened section is
the traditional area of operational art focused on orchestrating
the events in area 1 to achieve the objectives of area 2. The
increased sizes of areas 1 and 2 represent the larger operational
interaction with both strategy and tactics made possible by
technological advances. But at the same time, the diminishment of
the darkened section's size also represents the technologically
compressed decision cycle of the operational commander working at
magnified tempo in extended space. That commander will be faced
with the much more complex job of recognizing those simultaneous
strategic and tactical events that directly influence strategy
and integrating them into the full synchronization calculation
for those strategic objectives that result from the traditional
consideration of what tactical battles and engagements to join or
not to join at the operational level.90
The problems of the operational commander notwithstanding,
the compression of the three levels has the potential to increase
decisiveness in the vertical military continuum from the tactical
to the national military strategic level, certainly against a
technologically inferior opponent. But that decisiveness can be
affected, as the JCS description also implies, by the
communication-information revolution that has gathered speed in
recent decades. Now the technology that has streamlined and
compressed the vertical continuum has also added a horizontal
dimension (Figure 6) that provides the potential for the military

at any level of war to influence national strategy directly. In
the age of CNN, future wars and OOTW will occur in real time for
both the American people and their policymakers. That this
development can have positive results against an enemy was
illustrated by the Gulf War. But the more pernicious results in
terms of less favorable events up and down that continuum has a
long history, whether it be the dismissal of Churchill from the
Asquith government after the operational defeat at Galopoli, the
decision of LBJ not to run for reelection as a result of TET, or
the effects of the tactical loss of U.S. Army rangers in Somalia
on the tenure of former Secretary of Defense Aspin.
All this means a growing complexity with shorter decision
time for the operational commander. At the same time, the midand high-intensity war of the future will add to the emptying of
the battlefield even as that field expands in spatial and
intellectual terms. At the tactical level, the individual soldier

will be able to have a greater impact on events in this expanded
battle space because of increased weapons lethality and an
increased ability to direct accurately long-range precision
fires. This, in turn, will offer more opportunities for the
operational commander by increasing the connection between the
tactical battle space and the operational area, whether it be the
theater of war or the theater of operations. The result is a new
JCS-approved approach to deep operations with a focus on
functions not forces.91 Previously, air theorists tended to limit
the land attack to the actual combat between committed forces
with anything beyond the range of organic fires belonging to the
air commander. Now with permission for tactical commanders to
pursue battle objectives by using either deep or close combat
operations as the main effort, battles and engagements far beyond
the forward line of friendly forces can decide major operations
and campaigns.
This type of technology-enhanced maneuverability has been
perceived as a key result of the RMA, marking the victory over
the Clausewitzian linear methods of the past by the concepts of
nonlinear warfare, in which
smaller, fast moving, more independent units maneuver
around a battlefield, coalesce to attack enemy
formations, then melt away into smaller component parts
less vulnerable to smart weapons. As in war at sea, the
focus will be not so much on seizing territory as on
destroying enemy combat forces.92
This perception, as General Franks has pointed out, is
premature, noting that the "force-projection battlefield
framework can and probably will vary from linear to nonlinear,
with separation of units in time, space and distance."93 For even
as operational art recognizes the need for operational maneuver
free of the restraints of fixed lines, there will always be a
need for integrated operations and the sustainment thereof. The
combination is not new, only unfamiliar. In 1944, Field Marshal
Slim used a combination of linear and nonlinear operations to
gain and maintain the initiative in Burma. At that time, the
British leader pulled the 14th Army back to the Imphal-Kohima
plain and consolidated his lines by establishing a continuous
front. This had the effect of drawing the Japanese army into a
disadvantageous battle which Slim then exploited by initiating
once again a bold nonlinear offensive that eventually produced
victory.94
There is also nothing new in the role that technology will
play in terms of communications up and down the compressed
continuum of war. "From Plato to NATO," Martin van Creveld has
pointed out in this regard, "the history of command in war
consists essentially of an endless quest for certainty."95 But
that certainty is not necessarily enhanced by the quantum leap in
technology which may now inflict Clausewitz's "fog of war" in the
form of what General Starry has called "an operational

information glut."
More information from more sources, made available more
quickly than ever before, equals system overload.
'We're gonna kill 'em with silicon.' Unhappily we may
kill ourselves with silicon unless we learn to get the
right information to the right person at the right time
in the right place. Processing and transmission
technologies far outstrip our ability to assimilate,
sort, and distribute information. The information genie
is out of the bottle. Whether or not . . . enthusiasm
for genie performance is soundly based remains to be
seen. Serious dialogue is required. But first some
serious research about how living systems--people and
organizations--process information and make decisions.
It is all too easy to overestimate what modern
technology might do for us and underestimate what it
can do to us; especially is this the case with
information technology. We may indeed be in the
Information Age, but we have yet to decide who's in
charge!96
The effect of all this on the compressed continuum of war
can be momentous. Shorter decision times occasioned by that
compression and electronically gathered information mean less
time to discover ambiguities or to analyze those ambiguities that
are already apparent. Already in the Gulf War, the flood of new
information from the battlefield caused air commanders to switch
one-fifth of all missions in the time between the printing of
centralized air tasking orders and actual aircraft takeoff.
Moreover, there is also the danger that the military in the
future will become overly dependent on the type of detailed and
accurate information provided in training that just may not be
possible in the melee of war. With the verisimilitude of computer
simulators and war games increasing, the paradox is that warriors
in the future may find themselves all the more at a loss when
reality differs sharply from a familiar cyberworld.97
Such communication trends in the vertical continuum also
have implications for the national military strategy of CONUSbased force projection. If for example, U.S. forces in the future
require ballistic missile support in Southwest Asia, why send
such missiles when ICBMs with conventional warheads that will
soon approach accuracies of near zero CEP can do the job without
tying up strategic lift? Moreover, if theater based intelligence
assets, command centers and battle management platforms become
vulnerable to opponents, one solution may be the establishment of
such assets in CONUS with real-time linkages to theater forces.98
Such linkages were already in evidence in the Gulf War where
communications technology subverted hierarchies up and down the
continuum, even between the theater and the United States. That
such developments could be inevitable as well as desirable was
demonstrated by the NORAD staff in Colorado which relayed
warnings of SCUD launchings to both Riyadh and Tel Aviv. And in

the same conflict, thanks to instant communications, much of the
basis for CENTAF targeting came from the Air Force staff in the
Pentagon, which kept up a flow of targeting information and
proposals to the theater. This arrangement worked well for the
undermanned and overworked air staff working for the CINC in
Riyadh.99
All of this suggests even broader implications not only for
such time honored military principles as unity of command and
delegation of authority, but for the shibboleth of jointness as
well. It would not be the first technological impact on
jointness. In ancient times, for example, the galley ship
operating in sight of land in the Mediterranean was a joint
extension of land operations that ended with the development of
sails and other concomitant ocean-going capabilities. And the
increasing overlap of functions between the Services on the
extended battlefield of the compressed continuum of war has an
antecedent in the invention of the stirrup, which allowed the
mounted warrior to use weapons and wear equipment heretofore
associated exclusively with the foot soldier.100 On a more modern
note the image of Service staffs providing input directly to a
CINC's staff does subvert the intent of the 1986 GoldwaterNichols Act to make the warfighting theater CINCs semiautonomous,
guided by only the broadest direction from the national military
strategic level. On the other hand, as Elliot Cohen has observed,
there should be some room in the future within the altered levels
of war for the operational commander to deal directly with the
individual services, "each of which can pool a great deal of
operational expertise along with a common world view and an
esprit de corps difficult to find among a melange of officers."101
The instantaneous flow of information up the vertical
continuum also means that flag officers at the theater strategic
and even the national military strategic levels may have access
to the same information, or even more, as the forward deployed
operational and tactical commanders. The temptation to move down
that continuum will grow dramatically, particularly if augmented
by the pressure of policymakers, already feeling the force of
much of that information on the horizontal axis (Figure 6)
exerted through the people. Direct political involvement in
military affairs at all levels of war, of course, is not new nor
even unfamiliar. Clausewitz even advocated such involvement,
pointing out that political leaders in the cabinet must become
more knowledgeable concerning technical military affairs.102 And
both Winston Churchill and Adolf Hitler regularly descended to
the operational and tactical levels in World War II.103 Finally,
there was the insistence of the White House during the Vietnam
conflict on reviewing, often choosing and approving air strikes
on a daily basis. These are trends spawned by technologies that
will increase, as General Odom has indicated, in quantum
proportion to the changes in those technologies.
The implications of these technological changes have
only been vaguely glimpsed, even within U.S. military

circles. The most awesome one is that the kind of hourby-hour and minute-by-minute coordination of target
acquisition and the launching of strikes previously
confined to division and corps headquarters and to
tactical and strategic air commands within theaters
must now occasionally be performed at the national
level. In other words, the complexity of the 'tactical
operations centers' facing battalions, brigades, and
divisions in combat now confronts the National Military
Command Center at the Pentagon.104
At the same time, as the Army Chief of Staff has pointed
out, the integrative technology on the post-industrial
battlefield will increase the tempo of action-reactioncounteraction and thus continue the necessity for initiative at
lower command levels and for the concomitant decentralization of
decisionmaking.105 Many studies agree, foreseeing that combat
units will become, if anything, more autonomous and selfsustaining, that in the Third Wave military, like the Third Wave
Corporation, "decisional authority is being pushed to the lowest
level possible."106 If so, as the time streams indicate, the
picture of the small unit leader operating independently under a
commander's intent in the nirvana of pure Auftragstaktik, will
not be easy to create. Other images intrude: General Guderian
ceasing to transmit by radio during the 1940 invasion of France
to forestall interference by higher headquarters; helicopters
containing battalion, brigade and even division commanders and
their staffs stacked in the air above a company level fire fight
in Vietnam. All in all, as General Odom has observed, enhanced
communication throughout the compressed levels of war is "an
advantage that can just as easily introduce confusion and become
a liability."107
Warfighting vs. Operations Other Than War.
The technological compression of the three vertical levels
applies to OOTW as well as war, the former primarily due to the
types of missions and advances in communications, the latter to
advances in weapons and equipment as well as in communication.
Thus, a former high level U.N. official could point out that in
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, "you require
political direction every time you move a sentry post."108 This
strategic dominance allows the vertical framework to work as a
doctrinal basis in both arenas. Actions at the operational level
of war, James McDonough concludes in this regard, "are more
likely these days to occur across the spectrum of peace, crisis,
and war. Their commonality and their place in operational art is
fixed by their focused pursuit of strategic objectives."109 That
commonality is an important factor in an increasingly complex
military environment of shifting scenarios and rules of
engagement--a situation captured over a century ago by Lewis
Carroll.

"You will observe the Rules of Battle, of course?" the
White Knight remarked, putting on his helmet too. "I
always do," said the Red Knight, and they began banging
away at each other with such fury that Alice got behind
a tree to be out of the way of the blows. "I wonder,
now, what the Rules of Battle are," she said to herself
. . . .110
The U.S. military is currently producing a host of doctrinal
manuals dealing with all categories of OOTW. This focus on OOTW
is a direct result of the end of the cold war--the long twilight
conflict that kept attention on the core relationship between the
superpowers and only occasionally on the periphery in the socalled Third World, a categorization of nation-states that even
owed its origins to the bipolar nature of the international
system. In that world, the absence of superpower war was not
synonymous with global peace; nor was the absence of system
transformation through war translated into global stability.
Instead, recurrent violence in an unstable "peripheral" system
occurred alongside a stable "central" system, with an estimated
127 wars and over 21 million war-related deaths taking place in
the developing world during the cold war. Now, the United States
and other Western industrialized democracies, comprising less
than 13 percent of the global population, have turned their
attention on that developing world where in substantial parts
chaos is likely to dominate for the foreseeable future. As a
result, the principal post-cold war preoccupation of the United
States in terms of OOTW has been peace operations despite the
many other types of operations included in that category by
current U.S. military doctrine.111
Peace operations in the current doctrine encompass three
types of activities: diplomacy, peacekeeping and peaceenforcement.112 Classical peacekeeping was a cold war expedient
that overcame some of the disabling aspects of the bipolar
rivalry by relying on a token U.N. presence and the consent of
opposing parties rather than on military effectiveness. This
traditional capability was firmly grounded in Chapter VI of the
U.N. Charter which focused on pacific settlements of disputes.
Where such settlements failed, the enforcement mechanisms under
Chapter VII were designed to marshall the use of collective force
among the global powers--all reminiscent of World War II. But the
Security Council could not agree during the cold war on any
aspect of collective enforcement; and peacekeeping thus evolved
as an expedient, less powerful instrument which could be used
within the zero-sum environment of the superpowers. This meant in
turn that peacekeeping had limitations that proscribed its wider
use--that forces acting under its charter, unlike combat units,
could very seldom create the conditions for their own success.
Those limitations, evolving from practical experience in the cold
war and now enshrined in current U.S. military doctrine, include
the use of force only in self-defense and, most important, the
consent of all local belligerents. Peacekeeping forces, one
analysis concluded, are like a referee whose success depends "on

the consent of the players and their understanding of the rules
of the game but never on the pugilistic skills of the referee
himself."113
Since the end of the cold war, a "second generation" of U.N.
military operations has emerged under a rejuvenated category of
peace-enforcement which can include the protection of
humanitarian assistance, the guarantee of sanctions, and the
forcible separation of belligerents. In this environment, consent
is not likely and there is an increasing need for more military
power, effectiveness, and capability to exercise a wide range of
military responses. Unfortunately, peacekeeping during the cold
war elicited a price for the United Nation's institutional
competence in this regard. Consent in that era meant that there
were no enemies, and with no enemies there was little pressure on
the U.N. to be militarily effective. And with the stalemate in
the Security Council, there was no incentive on the part of the
member states to improve military competence. As a result, the
Military Staff Committee was stillborn; and ad hocracy in the
absence of "lessons learned" became the order of the day for U.N.
operations.114
Doctrine for peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations
is closely tied to the development of U.S. post-cold war national
security strategy, particularly, as Bosnia and Somalia have
demonstrated, concerning the issue of multilateralism versus
unilateralism. In the Bush administration, the U.S. military's
base force concept still reflected in the absence of a specific
threat the cold war desire to strike a balance between those two
concepts. That in turn guaranteed that force requirements would
exceed peace dividend expectations--a trend in the face of
uncertain regional threats increasingly hard to justify with
generic color plans. "I'm running out of villains," General
Powell remarked in this regard. "I'm down to Fidel Castro and Kim
Il Sung . . . ."115 Nevertheless, as Secretary Cheney indicated in
his Defense Strategy for the 1990s, the balance remained:
The perceived capability--which depends upon the actual
ability--of the United States to act independently, if
necessary, is thus an important factor even in those
cases where we do not actually use it. It will not
always be incumbent upon us to assume a leadership
role. In some cases, we will promote the assumption of
leadership by others, such as the United Nations or
other regional organizations.
In the end, there is no contradiction between U.S.
leadership and multilateral action; history shows
precisely that U.S. leadership is the necessary
prerequisite for effective international action. A
future President will need options allowing him to lead
and, where the international reaction proves sluggish
or inadequate, to act independently to protect our
critical interests.116

For the U.S. military, as we have seen, the doctrine of
combined arms warfighting whether in a unilateral or multilateral
environment will govern the shaping of the RMA. The goal is to
modify and create technologies and force structures within the
overarching doctrinal framework that adds to warfighting
effectiveness, while enhancing, or at the very least not
diminishing, OOTW capabilities. Certainly in the conventional
sense, for example, there is much to be learned in terms of
strategic mobility and organizational effectiveness from
humanitarian operations such as "Provide Comfort" in northern
Iraq or "Sea Angel" in Bangladesh. The crossover becomes more
explicit as the potential level of violence rises. "Since
operations other than war do not necessarily exclude combat,"
General Franks has pointed out, "how to think about planning and
executing those operations builds on the skills, toughness and
teamwork gained from the primary focus of our doctrine-warfighting."117
The value of this overarching framework was evident in the
Somalia operation. At the tactical level, the American forces
primarily dealt with their mission-essential and battle tasks
which included operations ranging from air assaults, patrolling,
cordon and searches, and security operations, to those oriented
on infrastructure repairs, civil affairs, and PSYOP. The
operations were "synchronized," in the U.S. division commander's
description, at an operational level which "tended to be complex,
with numerous players (joint, combined, political and NGOs)
involved and great uncertainty as to who the 'good guys' were."118
That notwithstanding, he remained sanguine about the crossover
ability within the doctrinal framework: "Well-trained, combatready, disciplined soldiers can easily adapt to peacekeeping or
peace enforcement missions. Train them for war; they adapt
quickly and easily to Somalia-type operations."119
In all this, technologies from the RMA will certainly play a
role. Those contributing to information dominance will be
particularly important, since a major challenge in many forms of
OOTW is to identify the enemy. Some technologies may emerge in
the areas of arms control verification and space-based
communications; others may range from sensors to nonlethal and
robotic weapons. The total effect of such potential trends
suggests to the Tofflers "that the new, Third Wave war form may
in time prove to be just as powerful against guerrillas and
small-scale opponents waging First Wave war as against Iraq-style
Second Wave armies."120
Technology, however, cannot completely bridge the gap
between warfighting and OOTW in a period of declining resources.
Stripping a division of major units to participate in a Somalitype operation is bound to have serious readiness repercussions.
Even the long standing Multinational Force Observer (MFO)
requirement in the Sinai requires extensive preparation for the
mission and retraining upon completion. Moreover, there are still

the questions concerning the psychological effects of prolonged
peacekeeping operations on the warfighter's determination to kill
and to win.121 In the end, the rationale returns full circle to
the tenet of "versatility" and the doctrinal priority based upon
the primary national military strategic focus on regional
conflict. "A professional, highly trained military with the human
and industrial capital needed to remain ready for regional wars
will be better able to gear up for a larger conflict than a
military designed to fight lower-intensity wars."122
It is a rationale that has grown increasingly controversial
in the full flush of enthusiasm for multilateralism by the
Clinton administration. "The military people haven't looked at
the considerable middle zone between [Desert Storm] and no
action," a State Department official commented as Bosnia heated
up. "We need a new approach to peacekeeping . . . . By
foreclosing options, the military will get pushed in much
later."123 For Paul Bracken, the controversy itself is irrelevant,
since the choices are irrelevant. On the one hand there is
warfighting against "B" competitors, "mid-level developing states
with modernized conventional forces (much like Iraq in 1990),
with the possibility of Model T nuclear, chemical and biological
(NBC) forces." On the other, there is what is essentially OOTW
against "C" competitors, "militarily ineffectual nations with
complex or complicated security problems: ethnic civil war
(Yugoslavia), insurgency (Peru), terrorism (Egypt), civil
disorder (Somalia), or infiltration (narcotic flows)." Bracken's
advice is to avoid the messy "C" states and elevate the doctrine
that is driving the RMA to deal with the "terra incognita" of
potential "A" nations, "peer competitors, or major regional
competitors with which the United States may have to deal." In
the future, "B" countries may graduate to this level by a
combination of training, doctrine, and the availability worldwide
of advanced military technologies, to include weapons of mass
destruction. In any event, an emergent "A" state may not have a
direct adverse effect on U.S. interests, but like Germany after
1870, might so upset a regional balance as to affect those
interests.124
Finally, there are those like the analysts at the Henry
Stimson Center, who see resources as the key to the warfightingOOTW dichotomy. Peace operation needs, they believe, require the
creation of forces that could eventually include two specially
configured Army light divisions and a half dozen independent,
specialized battalions for monitoring operations. These units
would be placed under a specified Army Peacekeeping Command,
created to develop doctrine, specialized training and unique
equipment for international peacekeeping. These forces, the
authors emphasize, would be "additive to needs for unilateral
capabilities," that is "considered a supplemental requirement and
in force planning be added to whatever forces are believed to be
necessary to protect U.S. interests unilaterally
through
traditional types of military operations."125 That such an
approach in an era of resource constraints would find little

favor in the current administration is self-evident. The
administration initially embraced "assertive multilateralism"-what one author has termed "a kind of poor man's
internationalism," the idea of keeping the U.N. as a credible
alternative to Pax-Americana to keep defense costs under control.
International events have since disabused the Clinton White House
of this notion as well as its concomitant, the idea that it could
prove to be an "isolationist's internationalism," allowing
international action without the exertion of American power.126
And, in fact, in an article that apparently presages the longawaited Presidential Decision Directive on the subject, the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs recently
returned to the core of the strategic priority driving U.S.
military doctrine as the RMA progresses:
Let us be clear: peacekeeping is not at the center of
our foreign or defense policy. Our armed forces'
primary mission is not to conduct peace operations but
to win wars. The bottom-up review of our post-cold war
defense requirements insures that we remain prepared to
do that . . . . We will never compromise military
readiness to support peacekeeping. Nor would we
hesitate to end our engagement in a peace operation if
that were necessary to concentrate our forces against
an adversary in a major conflict.127

CHAPTER 4
THE SOCIOPOLITICAL DIMENSION
Samuel Huntington outlined two types of civil-military
relations in his classic The Soldier and the State. Subjective
civilian control is achieved by civilianizing the military,
making the armed forces the mirror of the state.128 For some
analysts, this occurred in Washington during the creation and
buildup of the national security state in the cold war, causing
traditional suspicions of a standing military to shift to the
Military Industrial Complex with the New Model Army consisting of
the Pentagon, the defense industry and the Congress, complemented
by "Beltway Bandits," defense research committees and think
tanks. One result, as Alex Roland pointed out, was:
a stalemate of experts, civilians in the services
matched against colleagues in the White House and
Congress. Officers have advanced degrees. Congressmen
are reserve officers. All wear business suits in
Washington. The Pentagon is politicized, and policy
formulation is militarized.129
Objective civilian control, on the other hand, depends on
achieving an equilibrium between the power of the military and
the ideology of the society. In this construct, the issue is the
power of the officer corps relative to civilian elites within
society balanced against the compatibility of the professional
military ethic with the political ideologies prevailing in
society. Thus, there was very little objective civilian control
in the period between the Civil War and World War II, in which
with few threats to the security of American society, there were
both antimilitary ideology and low military-political power,
countered only by the high military professionalism of armed
forces increasingly separate from society. These variables
oscillated for the American armed forces during the cold war,
reaching a zenith in the Reagan years much like that of the 186090 Prussian cum German military, with an objective balance
between military and political power within the government and an
unparalled peacetime military-societal compatibility--all of
which maximized the professionalism of the American military. The
nadir concerning the mix of all three variables in this period
was Vietnam. That conflict exposed not only fundamental rifts
between civilian and military leaders, but the psychological gap
that had opened up between the armed forces and the American
people. "The country that sent us off to war was not there to
welcome us home," two veterans observed in a recent best selling
account of that conflict. "It no longer existed. We answered the
call of one President who was now dead; we followed the orders of
another who would be hounded out of office, and haunted by the
war he mismanaged so badly."130
The civil-military problems in that war stemmed in part from
the civilian crisis management success of the Cuban missile

crisis. The result of that event seemed very Clausewitzian:
extreme centralized political control over the selection, timing
and coordination of military moves down to the lowest tactical
levels. The problem was that the crisis management school focused
only on deterrence in terms of coercive diplomacy and signaling,
with conventional forces, like their nuclear counterparts, having
utility only in their non-use. There was, as a consequence, no
attempt to think through the problems of actually using force for
political ends--the essence of Clausewitz's most famous dictum.
For the crisis management theorist, the threatened (or
even the real) use of force serves only as a means of
communication with one's opponent. He rejects or
ignores other uses of force, for example as a means of
affecting the enemy's will, or simply of denying him
possession of that which he desires. This restrictive
understanding reduces strategy to applied cognitive
psychology, or even the art of non-verbal
communication.131
The result of all this in Vietnam was the "gradual squeeze,"
using the weight of American air power combined with the
commitment of ground forces to signal U.S. resolve. One
consequence was that the initial incremental projection of
American forces had very little relationship to any strategic
conception of their use; and President Johnson's personal
selection of bombing targets came to symbolize not only the
tightly controlled escalation of the air war over Vietnam, but
the overall tightly centralized decisionmaking so symptomatic of
the crisis managers. Another consequence, as we have seen, was a
renewed doctrinal focus by the military on the vertical continuum
of war and on the need for a sustained iterative civil-military
interface at the dominant strategic level on that continuum. "As
military professionals we must speak out," General Weyand
reminded the Army, "we must counsel our political leaders and
alert the American public that there is no such thing as a
'splendid little war.' There is no such thing as a war fought on
the cheap . . . . The Army must make the price of involvement
clear before we get involved, so that America can weigh the
probable costs of involvement against the dangers of
noninvolvement."132
The reference to the American public also demonstrated a
renewed appreciation by the military of this third part of the
Clausewitzian trinity. In both Korea and Vietnam, the public
provided a high degree of initial support that declined as
casualties mounted and victory prospects in the conventional
sense dimmed--but also, as Eliot Cohen observed, "surprisingly
slowly." "Indeed," he concluded, "it is remarkable that it was
not until after three years of combat--in the case of Vietnam
until 1968--that a majority of the American public finally turned
against the War."133 For Vietnam by that time, much of the
centrist antiwar sentiment stemmed simply from frustration at the
inability to bring the war to a victorious and reasonably quick

conclusion. "No kind of greatness," Alexis de Tocqueville had
observed in this regard over a century prior to the Vietnam
conflict, "is more pleasing to the imagination of a democratic
people than military greatness which is brilliant and sudden . .
. ."134
The post-Vietnam military concerns with the other two-thirds
of the Clausewitzian trinity found political expression in a 1984
speech by the Secretary of Defense outlining six criteria for
commitment of U.S. troops abroad. The focus of Secretary
Weinberger's speech was the Vietnam experience, but it was also,
in fact, a reaction to another form of failed OOTW, the Marine
disaster in Lebanon as part of Multinational Force 2. Under this
so-called "Weinberger Doctrine," force would be used as a last
resort and with the clear intention of winning--but only when the
vital interests of the United States and its allies were
threatened. There must also be clearly defined political and
military objectives combined with the knowledge of how the U.S.
forces could accomplish those objectives. "War may be different
today than in Clausewitz's time, but the need for a well-defined
objective and a consistent strategy is still essential."
Moreover, the relationship between political and military
objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed
must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary with, as
a constant "beacon light," the basic question: "Is this conflict
in our national interest?" Finally, there was the requirement for
the reasonable assurance of support by the American people and
their elected representatives in Congress. "We cannot fight a
battle . . . at home while asking our troops to win a war
overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our
troops not to win, but just to be there."135
In recent years as the Somalian and Bosnian situations
heated up, the Weinberger Doctrine was reinforced by the U.S.
military's formulation of what came to be called "Overwhelming"
or "Invincible Force" doctrine--an absolutist position focused on
decisive victory, critics charged, "that suggests that America's
political and military leaders lack the judgement to distinguish
between the Boxer Rebellion and Vietnam while spending $290
billion a year for defense."136 General Bernard Trainor was
equally direct. "If you're only going to use the great military
capability we have in a clinical operation that is going to be
short, bloodless and victorious," he noted, "one has to question
whether that force doesn't become irrelevant in the confused
world we are seeing."137 General Powell's reply to such criticisms
demonstrated a clear audit trail back to the earlier doctrine.
"The reason for our success," he stated, referring to recent
American military operations, "is that in every instance we have
carefully matched the use of military force to our political
objectives."
Decisive means and results are always to be preferred,
even if they are not always possible. So you bet I get
nervous when so-called experts suggest that all we need

is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When
the desired result isn't obtained, a new set of experts
then comes forward with talk of a little escalation.
History has not been kind to this approach.138
It is a controversy that is part of the U.S. military's
current doctrinal dilemma concerning warfighting and OOTW--one
that was defined almost a decade ago by Secretary of State Shultz
in his reply to the Weinberger Doctrine, but muted at the time by
the cold war. In a complex world, Shultz pointed out, there were
also "grey-area challenges" in regional and local conflicts that
were often far removed from major war but nonetheless had
important cumulative effects on American credibility.
We live as is commonly said, on a shrinking planet and
in a world of increasing interdependence. We have an
important stake in the health of the world economy and
in the overall condition of global security; the
freedom and safety of our fellow human beings will
always impinge upon our moral consciousness. Not all
these challenges threaten vital interests, but at the
same time an accumulation of successful challenges can
add up to a major adverse change in the geo-political
balance . . . . American military power should be
resorted to only if the stakes justify it, if other
means are not available, and then only in a manner
appropriate to the objective. But we cannot opt out of
every contest. If we do, the world's future will be
determined by others--most likely by those who are the
most brutal, the most unscrupulous and the most hostile
to our deeply held principles.139
The Use of Force.
A report on the RMA concludes that "even in major regional
engagements and certainly in peacekeeping or other unconventional
missions, the American and world publics will expect relatively
clean operations, cheap in terms of U.S. lives lost . . . and the
damage done to local society."140 Implicit in this statement is
the subtle shift in the rationale for high technology that
emerged from the Gulf War. During the cold war, the promotion of
technology had been primarily linked to solving the West's
problems with the overwhelming preponderance of the Soviet
forces. In the conflict with Iraq, however, technology was linked
to the saving of American and Allied lives. This rationale has
lingered as the U.S. military moves forward with a national
military strategy focused on regional contingencies, the response
to which, former Secretary of Defense Cheney pointed out, "must
be decisive, requiring the . . . technological edge to win
quickly and with minimum casualties."141
All this confirms changes in outlook underway since the
Vietnam, if not the Korean War. Throughout most of America's

history, as battles from Antietam to Iwo Jima attest, minimizing
U.S. casualties was considered a desirable but hardly necessary
goal for achieving victory. And in fact the traditional criticism
of the American strategic way of war was that it emphasized
attrition and ignored maneuver and guile. That this aspect has
changed and will affect future conflicts was summarized in the
1991 CSIS after-action report on the Gulf War.
The scale of casualties deemed acceptable will vary
with the nature of the war. But it is an important
question whether U.S. citizens will accept far-flung
military operations if casualties are high. There was
great concern in Washington--and great hope in Baghdad-that public support in the United States for the Gulf
War would evaporate when the first 10,000 Americans
fell in battle. And if, as in this case, the outcome of
the war is never in doubt and the only question is how
many Americans give their lives to bring about victory,
then the priorities of U.S. military operations--and in
turn, defense procurement strategies--will change.142
Such considerations will be bypassed by the militarytechnical revolution, a subsequent CSIS report on the MTR
promises. That revolution will in fact expand the utility of
force easing the constraints on American policymakers by a
democratic society, particularly those dealing with the
interrelated subjects of friendly casualties, combat
decisiveness, and widespread collateral damage. War in the age of
the MTR, in other words, will be non-trinitarian in the sense
that a low cost, Blitzkrieg-type operation will make a satisfied
public a non-factor, allowing the use of force not just as a last
resort, but as an active instrument designed solely for the
United States to shape the evolving world order. "When the U.S.
interests at stake in a crisis or war are less than obvious to
the public," the study concludes in this regard, "the promise of
a less destructive operation will allow U.S. leaders to wield
their military instrument more efficiently."
With an RMA force, U.S. leaders will be increasingly
free to conduct such operations without assuming
massive risks. The RMA will render the military
instrument more effective by reducing the costs of
military operations, both to the United States and to
its adversaries, and will thereby help mitigate the
constraints on military operations imposed by media
coverage and public opinion.143
Much of this reflects what the Tofflers have called the
"growing fictionalization of reality," in which the Gulf War
comes across as a gigantic simulation.144 And yet at the same
time, they emphasize that "de-massified destruction, customtailored to minimize collateral damage, will increasingly
dominate the zones of battle . . . ."145 Certainly in the wake of
the Gulf War and with more discussion of the MTR and now the RMA,

the general international and domestic public expectation is that
precision weapons will allow the conduct of wars with far less
collateral damage. But this proved chimerical in a conflict that
revealed the potential fragility of the physical infrastructure
of modern economics. For the air campaign directed primarily at
Iraqi military forces also devastated that country's
communications, transportation and civil services, the latter
ranging from the supply of water and electricity to the provision
of health care. All this had further malevolent effects in the
form of malnutrition and disease far removed from the antiseptic
of precision weapons.146
These indirect effects notwithstanding, the role of air
power in the Gulf clearly reflected the emerging rationale for
technology as the means to provide quick decisive victory at very
little human cost. This preoccupation with limiting casualties in
the age of CNN meant that even enemy dead, as the "Highway of
Death" demonstrated in living color, would not be palatable to
the American people. All this has been reinforced by RMA studies
which predict the arrival of so-called nonlethal or disabling
technologies as part of the key to a near bloodless future use of
force in warfare. The ideal, at least for some air power
enthusiasts, would be a return to a type of 18th century warfare
in Europe in which mercenary armies operated in isolation from
society. But as we have seen, that age was not really marked by
strategic decisiveness; and in any event, war and society have
moved even closer over the centuries. Technological change, even
that envisaged by the most ardent believers in the RMA, will not
be enough to cause a reappearance of such a separation. And in
fact air power, for all its uniqueness in the history of warfare,
serves as a useful reminder that continuity is still vital to any
changes that emerge as the RMA progresses, and that in
particular,
glib talk of revolutionary change obscures the
organization impediments to truly radical change in the
conduct of war and, worse, its inherent messiness and
brutality. In the end, students of air power will serve
the country well by putting the Persian Gulf War in a
larger context, one in which the gloomy wisdom of
Sherman tempers the brisk enthusiasm of those who see
air power as a shining sword, effortlessly wielded,
that can create and preserve a just and peaceful world
order.147
Unlike the air power enthusiasts, the U.S. Army continues to
emphasize its linkages with society and has in fact incorporated
those connections into doctrine. In a section entitled "The
American Way of War," the current FM 100-5 emphasizes that
the people expect the military to accomplish its
missions in compliance with national values. The
American people expect decisive victory and abhor
unnecessary casualties. They prefer quick resolution of

conflicts and reserve the right to reconsider their
support should any of these conditions not be met . . .
. In the end, the people will pass judgment on the
appropriateness of the conduct and use of military
operations. Their values and expectations must be
met.148
Those expectations are generally high due to the Allied
victory in the Gulf War coupled with the information-enhanced
horizontal linkage of the public to the vertical continuum of
that conflict. And certainly, although it remains conjectural,
these expectations are tied to a great extent into a further
expectation that technology will continue to be decisive in
maximizing the desired outcomes.
Figure 7 demonstrates one aspect of the interplay of these
variables. In Quadrant 4 there is no problem: low expectations
are matched by low technical capability. This was generally the
situation during World War II, in which low public expectations
in terms of warfighting decisiveness were generally matched until
August 6, 1945 by the inability of technology to make a sudden
breakthrough. Quadrants 2 and 1 also pose no problems, since high
technological capability will satisfy either high or low
expectations. The public relief at the beginning of Desert Storm

demonstrates a Quadrant 2 situation, which by the end of that
conflict had moved to Quadrant 1. The latter situation marks the
permanent position for the United States in an ideal realization
of all that the RMA could portend for the future.
Quadrant 3 poses the most problems in terms of warfighting.
The result can be a World War I type situation in which the
public either has to be disabused of its expectations and
mobilized for greater and longer efforts after the conflict
begins, or allowed to exercise its national will for withdrawal.
Ideally for the American people, the civil-military interplay
that would include consideration of Weinberger doctrine criteria
as well as the concept of overwhelming force would preclude a
situation in which such a choice would have to be made after
initiation of hostilities. In any event, the United States is
unlikely to lose its technological edge concerning conventional
warfighting in the near future and move into the third quadrant.
But the effectiveness of that edge is by no means assured for
OOTW operations. Moreover there is no such doctrinal buffer for
most such operations, which will not necessarily and in most
cases probably not involve vital interests, defined under the
Weinberger criteria as sufficient to justify the use of force.
There are some types of these operations, peacekeeping in
particular, that would appear to avoid this requirement for focus
on vital interests. But as Somalia has demonstrated, peacekeeping
can quickly flow into a peace-enforcement situation in which
American casualties can turn the focus of the public and Congress
quickly back to the issue of vital national interests with
serious implications for American policy and credibility. "The
last thing we need," Senator Nunn concluded in this regard, "is
for the word to go out that the way to get Americans to leave a
country is to kill a few people."149
Equally important, OOTW operations such as peace-enforcement
or counterinsurgency are ultimately political in their foundation
even if conducted by the military. Thus, as we have seen, leading
edge technology is unlikely to allow military effectiveness to
transcend this foundation where "the finesse and expertise that
are the hallmarks of modern military professionalism count far
less than persistence and pure bloody-mindness."150 This means
that such operations are unlikely to be completed in an
expeditious manner, certainly in a time frame acceptable to the
American public and in terms of victory defined in military
activist vocabulary. "No democratic society . . . can fight a
fifty-year war," Douglas Pike concluded in this regard from his
long experience in Vietnam.151
In the end, the nature of most OOTW operations means that
with the possible exception of the principle of last resort, the
basic tenets of the Weinberger Doctrine will not apply in the
application of force. This is particularly true of the most
likely and most contentious of these operations likely to involve

the United States: peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. U.S. vital
interests will probably not be at stake; political and military
objectives will be vague and elusive as will the meaning of
victory; the military forces may become inappropriate as missions
shift; and for all these reasons as well as the inconclusive and
prolonged nature of these essentially political cum military
operations, there will be no sustaining public support. Finally,
given this political nature, the doctrine of rapid, massive
overwhelming force is unlikely to help and may, in fact, be
counterproductive in situations that in many cases call for
restraint and discretion in the application of force.152
Interests and Credibility.
In the wake of the Gulf War, U.S. troops have been involved
in astonishingly wide and divergent missions around the world
ranging from humanitarian relief operations like "Provide
Comfort" to deterring the spread of ethnic conflict in Macedonia.
This type of activity is reminiscent of Great Britain at the end
of the Victorian era in which its empire was an all-engulfing red
splash on the world map--three times the size of the Roman
Empire, with London representing what Rome had once been, caput
mundi, the head of the world. Because of that empire, successive
British governments believed that it was imperative to do
something about each outbreak of chaos anywhere in the world,
sometimes motivated by a fear that local conflicts might spiral,
and other times by a perception that inaction might damage
London's credibility in the various regions of the world. As a
result, two historians of the age of imperialism noted, "once
remote and petty interests in the Sudan, Uganda, and the northern
hinterlands of the Zanzibar were changing into safeguards of
Britain's world power."153
In 1881 at the height of British power, however, the
ascendancy of Germany began to alter the European balance of
power. But the United Kingdom and France, the two countries that
should have been the most concerned with this alteration, were
distracted to a great degree from this primary security problem
by a constant series of crises in Asia and Africa. Ironically,
this lack of attentiveness was to the very core conditions that
had ushered in an era of European peace and prosperity, thus
allowing both nations to pursue imperialism in the first place.
By the time Britain and France refocused their attention from the
periphery to the core after the turn of the century, it was too
late.
Thinking in such time streams suggests a need for
prioritization of effort. This need has traditionally been met by
national interests that represent by descriptive degrees on a
continuum of intensity (e.g., vital, important, peripheral) the
willingness of national actors to use national power to achieve
objectives derived from those interests. Thus, as represented in
the Weinberger Doctrine, a vital interest is defined as the only

one for which the United States would be willing to use military
force. This linkage had a distinctly cold war character since the
use of American military power in any situation during that
period carried the risk of confrontation with the USSR and
consequently an escalation of conflict that could threaten the
nation's survival. That such definitions could have a subjective,
almost circular character to them was illustrated by the 1950
invasion of South Korea, the survival of which had been defined
as outside vital U.S. interests but which, because of the nature
of the attack, quickly joined that category. All that
notwithstanding, the degree of intensity of national interests is
still a reliable relative guide--useful, as an example, in the
case of Bosnia as a reminder that continuity is not always a
product of time streams. "It is important to understand," one
analyst commented, "that conflict in the Balkans led to a general
European war in 1914 because the great powers cared too much
about instability in the Balkans; today they care too little.
This may cause many problems, but it cannot cause a general
war."154
The use of national interests for prioritization is
particularly important in terms of deterrence. The basis for
conventional deterrence, like that of nuclear, has always been
credibility--the combination of capability and the willingness to
use that capability. "Usually the most convincing way to look
willing," Herman Kahn once pointed out about the latter, "is to
be willing."155 Commitment is thus an important adjunct of that
will. But as Thomas Shelling demonstrated long ago, if the depth
of the commitment exceeds the depth (that is, intensity) of the
national interests at stake, the element of commitment is
jeopardized.156 Vietnam, of course, was the ultimate example of
how closely commitment can be tied with credibility. U.S. policy
toward that country was motivated at least partially by the
determination to be perceived as a reliable protector--a key link
to the seamless web of containment. Credibility in the context of
East-West relations, in other words, became an interest in
itself. The problem was that the scale of commitment to that
country failed to achieve some plausible proportionality and
linkage to its intrinsic value to the United States--a value that
American policymakers declared with ever decreasing credibility
to the Home Front.157
Credibility is an even more amorphous concept in the new
international order where there is no great enemy and where local
conflicts in the absence of an East-West conflict are for the
most part really local. In this environment, the United States
does not lose credibility with every decision not to intervene in
foreign crises. Instead, what is required for credibility is the
careful choice of interests, the vigilant protection of those
interests, and, above all, the issuance of only those threats and
promises concerning these interests that will be fulfilled. In
the past, it has been the casual use by the United States of
threats and promises that has damaged its credibility.158

Prioritization is also particularly important in an era of
declining resources in which, as a recent Rand study indicated,
"the issue of 'How Much Is Enough?' has been replaced by 'How
Little Is Enough?' as the central issue concerning future
military strategy . . . ."159 The key in this regard is not to
jeopardize America's unique warfighting capability, an essential
pillar for global stability, by taking on OOTW missions that any
nation can perform, particularly those involving peace
operations. Just because the Soviet threat has disappeared,
doesn't mean that many of the issues, conflicts and problems of
small countries or failed states are any more closely linked with
U.S. vital or important interests than they were in the cold war.
The periphery is still the periphery; and any rational
calculation of national interests points to a national security
prioritization that focuses on Paul Bracken's potential "A"
category peer competitors as well as any "B" level rogue states
capable of attempts at regional hegemony. The "C" category world
of OOTW will simply not meet the strict cost-effectiveness in
this rational environment.160
Ultimately, that world cannot be divorced from either the
costs or the likely success of a mission. After all, the United
States refrained from intervention to aid Hungary in 1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968 because the dangers seemed exorbitant
despite the fact that the independence of those countries from
the Soviet Union was a desired goal. In a similar manner, the
most salient argument against the Vietnam War was not that the
spread of Communism in Indochina was tolerable, but that the
costs of preventing its spread were prohibitive. This is not to
say that the American polity is unwilling to expend American
lives in furtherance of, for example, an humanitarian mission.
The bombing of the rail lines to Auschwitz, for example, might
have cost the lives of some U.S. airmen. And American casualties
would certainly have resulted from any attempts to stop Pol Pot's
"Killing Fields." But the fact that these two cases are the most
frequently cited for humanitarian operations also suggests that
there must be a very high threshold in rational cost
effectiveness for expending American lives in this type of
intervention.161
The post-cold war international arena, however, is not a
purely rational environment. The United States is in an Indian
summer in national security in which there are no major threats
to its vital interests or those of its allies. At the same time,
as we have seen, the instability on the "periphery" that marked
the cold war has not diminished, but is now in fact embellished
for the American public by instantaneous global communications.
One result has been a policy shift in terms of the use of
military force. As he left office, President Bush pointed out in
a major speech that such use must be considered on a case-by-case
basis without "rigid criteria" that "would give would-be
troublemakers a blueprint for determining their own action." "The
relative importance of an interest is not a guide," he concluded.
"Military force . . . might be the best way to protect an

interest that qualilfied as important, but less than vital."162
In such a construct, the cumulative effects of credibility
described by Secretary Shultz in 1985 have returned as an
important rationale for the use of force--almost as in the cold
war era, an all-encompassing interest in itself. "It is clearly
in the U.S. interest," one report concludes, "to be known as a
reliable ally, a contributor to regional stability, a defender of
international law, a supporter of peace conflict resolution, a
feared adversary, and a nation committed to the common good."163
This broader definition of security seems to imply a role of
global policeman for the United States--an implication reinforced
by time streams that go back no further than Vietnam. But
dominoes are not just a manifestation of the cold war. The other
three major wars fought by America in this century came about at
least partially because of narrow definitions of security: that
of Britain prior to World War I and of the United States prior to
World War II and Korea, the latter embodied in its exclusion from
the American defense perimeter. "We ought not to employ force
casually," Joshua Muravichik concludes in this regard, "but
neither should we reserve it for little more than direct selfdefense. For such a course is the one most likely to put us in a
position in which we have to use force precisely for direct selfdefense, and at a far greater cost in American blood and
treasure."164
In all this, U.S. military doctrine has attempted to
accommodate change. For the Army, the "versatile" Decathlete of
FM 100-5, the major problem is not to harm agility in one event
by overtraining in another. In the Decathlon, this is avoided by
judicious scheduling of events: the shot put, for instance, would
not immediately proceed or follow the javelin throw. No such
scheduling is possible for the Army in the current environment in
which warfighting and myriad forms of OOTW can often make
simultaneous demands across a blurred continuum of peace, crisis
and war. Still, it is a situation that, in varied form the U.S.
military and, in fact most military, have faced in their
histories. "We have to make war as we must," Lord Kitchener once
commented, "and not as we should like to."165
All that notwithstanding, the situation in the frenzied pace
of post-cold war transition has placed some strains on objective
civil-military relations. Doctrinally, the emphasis on decisive
victory and friendly casualty limitations can be seen as an
attempt by the military to balance military-political power with
military-societal compatibility. But decisive victory is a
political condition--an end state that should be spelled out by
policymakers. There will be times--the Gulf War, for example-when less than decisive military victory will be a political
requirement. In a similar manner, the doctrinal focus on casualty
limitation, normally the realm of the statesman, might impart a
degree of conservatism that could stifle creativity and
innovation. It might also cause an overemphasis on technology as
a panacea within the RMA that in turn could adversely affect R&D

and force structure.166
The use of overwhelming force appears to be a more
legitimate military preoccupation despite criticism that such
advocacy on the part of the military reverses Clausewitz's most
fundamental dictum by making policy the extension of war. But it
is, in fact, very Clausewitzian for the military to outline what
it needs to achieve the objectives set by policymakers and then
to describe the risk estimation in terms of the calculated
relationship of the provided means to the ends. This calculation
is the essence of strategy. It does not increase the power of the
military vis-a-vis governmental elites, anymore than that offered
by the normal leverage of a divided government. But it does help
to achieve a balance of this political-military relationship with
the demands of American societal values.167
In the end, it is the combination of this balance with a
flexible doctrinal framework that has mitigated the natural
tendency of the military to preserve its institutional values
solely in terms of warfighting. Without that balance, the
leavening influence of the public would not affect the process.
And without the structure of the vertical continuum of war
leading ultimately to the highest and most dominant political
level of strategy, there could be no overarching doctrinal
coherence. How serious the adverse synergism of these twin
deficits can be was illustrated by the Nazi Wehrmacht, which
perceived that without swift decisive victory, other nonmilitary
factors would intrude, threatening the position of war as the
autonomous domain of the military elite. This was the ultimate
rationale for Blitzkrieg, which in fact was the opposite of
doctrine, since success rather than design determined the
priority of actions. That type of opportunism caused impromptu
operations based on the belief that technology (Guderian) or
superior war fighting command capabilities (von Manstein) would
make the ultimate difference in conflict. But cut off from the
public and deprived of anything approaching a coherent strategic
level of war, there could be no sense of operational
purposefulness for the military other than to pursue its
institutional goals almost exclusively. "We still failed to find
any satisfaction in their achievements," von Manstein wrote of
German tactical victories in 1941," . . . for no one was clear
any longer . . . what higher purpose, all these battles were
supposed to serve."168

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
When thinking in time streams, the key for the future is to
recognize in the present those departures from the past--those
changes which divert or have the potential to divert familiar
flows from the accustomed channels. The pace of technological
change is, of course, a departure from the past that has such a
potential for warfare. For the military, which has less room for
any illusions about the stakes, this is particularly important.
"If you have lost a battle," G. K. Chesterton once noted, "you
cannot believe you have won it."169 In all this, there is a need
for a constant comparison between the present and past coupled
with a sensitivity to prospective breaks in the continuity that
will allow change to be expedited or limited, countered or
accepted--at the very least guided. That comparison indicates
that military doctrine and its organizational concomitant will
play a key role in such an effort concerning technological
change. This is the essence of what has come to be called the
RMA.
But that comparison also draws attention to the continuity
of war as a uniquely human activity, one in which a kind of
"Murphy's Law" transcends the streams of time. Doctrine and
technology, for instance, have rarely been in synch throughout
history. And technological surprise has not often been achieved,
and then only for short periods. Certainly, the utilization of
force has not been rendered any more decisive or easier for any
length of time by technological change. Nor has there been any
easing of the tension that has traditionally marked the
coexistence of military effectiveness and technological
efficiency. The result is that RMAs have never been revolutionary
in the sense of occurring--even in the expanded perspective of
time streams--overnight. In all this, as Neustadt and May
conclude, "it may help . . . to bear in mind that futures arrive
detail by detail and that decisions lightly taken sometimes carry
awful costs."170
The RMA that is currently unfolding will only add to the
complexity of those decisions, particularly because of the
sociopolitical changes which, as Michael Roberts has pointed out,
accompany any such revolution. Thus, the Clinton administration's
recent emphasis on the primacy of warfighting in the use of force
is not a symptom of civil-military imbalance, but rather an
acknowledgement that there is a need for prioritization of effort
and that once the current transition is sorted out, the American
people are not likely to support foreign ventures that are not
clearly linked to U.S. national security interests. And that, at
least for the foreseeable future, appears to rule out the First
Wave form of war embodied in many OOTW missions, leaving the
field to the warfighting that still combines the Second and Third
Wave forms. But as we have seen, nothing is immutable when it
comes to the utility of military force. As a consequence, there

may be a need for strategic leadership that resists a momentary,
video-driven urge by the public for intervention in areas or
situations of only peripheral interest to the United States. Or
conversely, that leadership may require the molding of public
support for such an intervention, either unilaterally or
multilaterally, recognizing the broader need for cumulative
credibility and moral leadership as the world's only superpower,
even while acknowledging that the interest or interests involved
remain peripheral and that involvement in such a venture can make
American credibility an interest in itself.
In all this, the U.S. military must be versatile and
flexible in dealing as much with political and social change as
with that occasioned by technology. This adaptability will
prevent the development of a hunkering in mentality as defender
of the status quo. But it requires facing the issues of change
and continuity head-on. In a similar period of complexity,
medieval chivalry transformed itself into the disciplined
professional cavalry that played a key role in European wars for
200 years. And the army of Frederick the Great reemerged at the
hands of the great Prussian reformers from the disastrous
encounters with Napoleon's revolutionary army to become one of
the greatest war machines in military history. The efforts of the
U.S. military in the wake of the Vietnam conflict were no less
momentous.171
The 1993 FM 100-5 clearly evokes this theme of renewal in
change and continuity, the essence of doctrine which "captures
the lessons of past wars, reflects the nature of war and conflict
in its own time, and anticipates the intellectual and
technological developments that will bring victory now and in the
future."172 This interaction provides, in turn, a dynamic
environment--"a context," the Chief of Staff of the Army points
out, "within which the debate over evolving doctrine can
continue."173 The framework for that debate is the vertical
continuum of war, a dynamic entity that "must be reflective of
constantly changing strategic and tactical environments, and the
operational art, whose job is to connect the two, must be
responsive to all changes."174 The debate will help ensure in the
future against the doctrinal equivalent of what has been called
"the dead hand of Napoleon," a reference to the persistence of
Napoleonic tactics and strategy long after they were rendered
obsolete by changes in weapons technology.175 The debate will also
keep the strands of change and continuity in balance as the Army
prepares for missions in peace and crises as well as war.
The key to the Army approach is the retention of the three
level vertical framework of war, spawned as the result of an
earlier RMA that emptied the battlefield while it expanded the
concepts of time and space. This doctrinal continuity maintains
the focus on the primacy of the strategic level--all the more
important because of the sociopolitical as well as technological
changes that will accompany the RMA. In addition, there is a
great deal of flexibility provided by the divorce of the

framework from any particular size force and by its recognition
that all power elements can play a role in the complex process of
operational synchronization. It is a framework, in short, that
accommodates OOTW as well as warfighting. And in fact, the
increasingly compressed nature of the vertical continuum for
warfighting is the normal state for many OOTW missions, in which
it is almost a cliche that the actions of a soldier on point can
have strategic and political results.
The flexibility in the doctrinal framework also provides
room to examine the constantly shifting organizational tensions
between coherence and dissonance, jointness and independence, and
centralization and decentralization--particularly as they apply
to the current Goldwater-Nichols structure, a rational
organization designed for immediate response to a well-defined
threat. Equally important, this flexibility allows for innovative
give-and-take in the relationship of technology and doctrine. Too
rigid a doctrine, as the French demonstrated prior to World War
I, can impede an appreciation of military-technological changes.
It is also important, however, that technology focused on
immediate or near-term potential threats not hold back long-term
operational concepts or R&D concerning technology focused further
in the future. In the interwar years, for instance, the U.S.
armed forces developed new concepts of operation that were to
prove successful against future "A" level peer competitors,
despite the fact that national policy and sentiment rejected such
efforts because there were no obvious threats to vital interests.
For the Navy, the result was innovative doctrine on carrier task
force operations and amphibious landings. Equally significant,
all this took place at the Naval War College in an environment
free from the tyranny of the "in box," and at a time when Japan
was not a U.S. enemy, when the budget for all the services
together comprised less than one percent of GNP, and when the
force structure for such concepts was nonexistent.176
Within the doctrinal framework, technology will cause
warfare to become more, not less, Clausewitzian. To begin with,
any society or group, whether trinitarian or non-trinitarian, has
identifiable pressure points that a trinitarian state can reach
and target without resorting to a fourth generational or First
Wave response. These third generational responses, moreover, are
normally applied as part of the larger employment of all elements
of power, defined in terms of the trinitarian national state. The
basic fact remains that it is still a state-centric world in
which, as even van Creveld admits, only other technologically
developed states can have a major impact on U.S. national
security. "However spectacular the effects of non-trinitarian
war," he writes, "and however tragic the fate of its victims, at
present it is incapable of seriously threatening the security of
Western states . . . ."177 All of this would assuredly still be
unconvincing for John Keegan who, as we have seen, perceives
technological developments as a major impetus toward a
multicentric world. In reply, Michael Howard has pointed out the
continuity of these views with those in Norman Angell's 1910 The

Grand Illusion--a paean to economic interdependence that faded in
the hot August days of 1914. "I have an awful feeling," he
concludes," that this is where I came in."178
It is in this state-centric world that the technologically
induced compression of the vertical doctrinal framework only
shortens, and thereby strengthens the link of war to policy. With
time compressed over extended space and with that immense space
rendered comprehensible by a technological coup d'oeil, an entire
theater can become a simultaneous battlefield where events, as in
the days of Napoleon, may determine national destinies. In
addition, the horizontal, real time communication link to the
vertical continuum of war only reinforces the interaction of the
people with the other two thirds of the Clausewitzian trinity.
War, in other words, is still a political act. The
sociopolitical effects of revolutions in military affairs that
have occurred since the 16th century have only reinforced this
fact. At the same time, as historical streams throughout this
period indicate, there is always the danger that such
"revolutions" may foster a narrow military view of
professionalism focused purely on technical and tactical
competence with technology viewed as the ultimate panacea,
particularly in an era of downsizing. Part of the answer is to
continue and enlarge upon the iterative civil-military process
that grew out of the creation of the national security state
during the cold war without succumbing to Huntington's subjective
civilian control. "The exclusion of soldiers from politics does
not guarantee peace," Bacevich reminds us. "It only guarantees
that those who command armies in wartime will be politically
obtuse."179 Part of the answer also lies in the continuity of U.S.
military doctrine; for it is well to remember that operational
art is designed to make warfare more effective in a Clausewitzian
political instrumental sense, and that without a framework that
keeps a doctrinal focus on the upper reaches of strategy, there
is always the danger of technological efficiency overriding that
effectiveness.
Implicit in both these answers is a third one, particularly
important if the owl of Minerva is to fly at dawn as well as dusk
as the RMA unfolds. For an understanding of the past is
absolutely essential to the military professional if continuity
and change in that "revolution" are to be understood in the
present which, in Bob Dylan's words, "will later be past."
Thinking in such time streams will require the same type of focus
summarized by Michael Howard almost 30 years ago in his report on
Service Colleges to the British Ministry of Defence.
There will always be a prime need for the fighting
leader in the armed forces; but . . . today the junior
fighting leader often needs to exercise a considerable
degree of independent and informed judgement . . .
while the demands made on his seniors find little
parallel in any civil profession. To fit officers for

so testing a career . . . it is as necessary to extend
their intellectual powers as it is to strengthen their
moral powers and their capacity for physical
endurance.180
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